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100 N.C. L. REV. 1015 (2022)

RESISTING FACE SURVEILLANCE WITH
COPYRIGHT LAW*
AMANDA LEVENDOWSKI**
Face surveillance is animated by deep-rooted demographic and deployment
biases that endanger marginalized communities and threaten the privacy of all.
But current approaches have not prevented its adoption by law enforcement.
Some companies have offered voluntary moratoria on selling the technology,
leaving many others to fill in the gaps. Legislators have enacted regulatory
oversight at the state and city levels, but a federal ban remains elusive. Both
approaches require vast shifts in practical and political will, each with
drawbacks. While we wait, face surveillance persists. This Article suggests a
new possibility: face surveillance is fueled by unauthorized copies and
reproductions of photographs, and resisting face surveillance compels us to
consider countering it with copyright law.
So why haven’t face surveillance companies been overwhelmed with copyright
infringement litigation? Fair use. This Article lays out the litigation landscape
before analyzing the recent Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle,
alongside other key fair use cases, to examine why this complex doctrine may
permit many uses of machine learning without allowing face surveillance to copy
and reproduce online profile pictures. Some face surveillance companies claim to
be transformative search engines, but their business models are more like private
subscription services that are rarely found to be fair use. And scraping profile
pictures harms the unique licensing market for these photographs, which grows
as companies and researchers increasingly reject scraped photos as sources of face
analysis training data. This Article concludes that copyright law could curtail
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face surveillance without waiting for companies or Congress to catch up—and
we ought to use it.
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2020, Robert Julian-Borchak Williams was arrested on his front
lawn while his wife and two daughters watched.1 He had no idea why he was
being arrested. Officers declined to say why or much else, even telling his wife
to “Google it” when she asked where they were taking him.2 Williams found
himself at the Detroit Detention Center, where he spent the night in jail before
the officers let him take a good look at the blurry surveillance photograph
behind his arrest.3 “I hope you guys don’t think that all [B]lack men look alike,”
Williams said, holding the surveillance video still next to own face.4 It was

1. Kashmir Hill, Wrongfully Accused by an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/06/24/technology/facial-recognition-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/28ZL-W6DW (dark archive)]
(Aug. 3, 2020) [hereinafter Hill, Wrongfully Accused].
2. Bobby Allyn, ‘The Computer Got It Wrong’: How Facial Recognition Led to False Arrest of Black
Man, NPR, https://www.npr.org/2020/06/24/882683463/the-computer-got-it-wrong-how-facial-reco
gnition-led-to-a-false-arrest-in-michig [https://perma.cc/WQ8M-K4V2] (June 24, 2020, 9:05 PM).
3. Hill, Wrongfully Accused, supra note 1.
4. Robert Williams, Opinion, I Was Wrongfully Arrested Because of Facial Recognition. Why Are
Police Allowed To Use It?, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/20
20/06/24/i-was-wrongfully-arrested-because-facial-recognition-why-are-police-allowed-use-this-techn
ology/ [https://perma.cc/PE6R-JCJV (dark archive)].
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obviously not him. A detective explained the problem: “[T]he computer must
have gotten it wrong.”5
Williams was misidentified by a face recognition algorithm developed by
a company called DataWorks Plus,6 which is one of many companies in the
business of selling face recognition technology to law enforcement.7 The same
month that Williams was arrested, journalist Kashmir Hill revealed that a
startup called Clearview AI was snapping up selfies and profile pictures to
create a massive face recognition database for law enforcement.8 In less than
three years, Clearview AI systemically copied three billion photographs to
create face recognition tools for six hundred police departments, all without the
consent of individuals, authorization of social media companies, or knowledge
of the public.9 Backlash was swift. Within days, the largest social media
companies alleged that Clearview AI’s unauthorized scraping of their websites
violated their terms of service—at that time an arguable violation of the

5. Id. Williams continued to be held until that evening, totaling thirty hours in detention. Id. In
response, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan filed a letter with the Detroit Police
Department. Letter from Phil Mayor, Senior Staff Att’y, ACLU Fund of Michigan, to Off. of the
Chief Investigator, Detroit Pub. Safety (June 24, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-michigancomplaint-re-use-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/S3CA-PZCL].
6. Hill, Wrongfully Accused, supra note 1. The company got its start offering mugshotmanagement software. Id.
7. Other providers include NEC, Ayonix Corporation, and Clearview AI. Jared Council, Facial
Recognition Companies Commit To Police Market After Amazon, Microsoft Exit, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2020,
5:28 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facial-recognition-companies-commit-to-police-market-afteramazon-microsoft-exit-11591997320 [https://perma.cc/FH6K-UNDD (dark archive)].
8. Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html [https://
perma.cc/QF3A-L55Z (dark archive)] (Nov. 2, 2021) [hereinafter Hill, The Secretive Company]. Private
customers, including those experimenting with the technology on an unpaid trial basis, included banks,
retail stores, and sports franchises. Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins & Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial
Recognition App Has Been Used by the Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA, BUZZFEED
NEWS, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/8A9X-JRES] (Feb. 27, 2020, 11:37 PM). Clearview AI was not the only company
using scraped photographs to power its face surveillance technology. Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition’s
‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos Scraped Without Consent, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbc
news.com/tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secret-millions-online-photos-scraped-n98192
[https://perma.cc/6GXV-PY5Q] (Mar. 17, 2019, 11:25 AM).
9. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 8. That number has since skyrocketed to ten billion.
Will Knight, Clearview AI Has New Tools To Identify You in Photos, WIRED (Oct. 4, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-ai-new-tools-identify-you-photos/ [https://perma.cc/3KKKGZ9V (dark archive)]. For an accounting of why the public is so rarely part of the surveillance
technology procurement process, see generally the illuminating work of Catherine Crump, Surveillance
Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1595 (2016) and Ira S. Rubinstein, Privacy Localism,
93 WASH. L. REV. 1961 (2018). See also Amanda Levendowski, Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency,
36 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4–5) (on file with Berkeley Technology
Law Journal) (recommending the use of the federal trademark register to investigate new, secret
surveillance technologies).
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Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.10 The public balked at the violation and began
strategizing about how to resist it.11
Face surveillance is a broad term that embraces multiple biometric systems
that use algorithms to analyze faces, such as face detection, face classification,
and, as emphasized here, face recognition.12 Concerns over face surveillance are
far from new. Legal scholars have expressed wariness over the use of face
recognition technology in classrooms,13 by corporations,14 or during carceral
investigations.15 Julie Cohen’s vision of the biopolitical domain warned of the
10. Alfred Ng & Steven Musil, Clearview AI Hit with Cease-and-Desist from Google, Facebook over
Facial Recognition Collection, CNET (Feb. 5, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/clearviewai-hit-with-cease-and-desist-from-google-over-facial-recognition-collection/ [https://perma.cc/MR8L
-Z7U2]; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030; Van Buren v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 1659 n.8 (2021) (“For
present purposes, we need not address whether this inquiry turns only on technological (or ‘codebased’) limitations on access, or instead also looks to limits contained in contracts or policies.”).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See Face Surveillance, LAW INSIDER (Jan. 17, 2022, 12:50 PM), https://www.lawinsider.com/
dictionary/face-surveillance [https://perma.cc/K9KY-MW2T] (defining “face surveillance”); see also
Face Recognition Technology, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-techn
ologies/face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/49K2-WY98] (“Facial recognition systems are
built on computer programs that analyze images of human faces for the purpose of identifying them.”).
13. See, e.g., Nila Bala, The Danger of Facial Recognition in Our Children’s Classrooms, 18 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 249 (2020) (discussing the implications of facial recognition on children’s privacy,
development, and existing inequities); Lindsey Barrett, Ban Facial Recognition Technologies for
Children—and for Everyone Else, 26 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 223 (2020) (discussing how young people
have less say over where they go and what they do, making them exceptionally vulnerable to facial
recognition technologies). See generally Lindsey Barrett, Rejecting Test Surveillance in Higher Education,
2023 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023) (discussing the prevalence of facial recognition and
adjacent technology in remote-proctoring software).
14. See generally, e.g., Yana Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face
Recognition Privacy in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165 (2012) (discussing proposed privacy
requirements of social network companies); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Regulating Facial Recognition Technology
in the Private Sector, 24 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2020) (posing guided questions to outline potential
facial recognition regulation); Kerri A. Thompson, Countenancing Employment Discrimination: Facial
Recognition in Background Checks, 8 TEX. A&M L. REV. 63 (2020) (positing that the technology that
made facial recognition viable also has discriminatory implications in the employment context).
15. See generally, e.g., Sabrina A. Lochner, Saving Face: Regulating Law Enforcement’s Use of Mobile
Facial Recognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 201 (2013) (discussing law enforcement’s
use of the Mobile Offender Recognition and Information System and associated privacy and policy
concerns); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L. REV.
1105 (2021) (revealing limitations of the Fourth Amendment in constraining the increasing use of facial
surveillance and artificial intelligence by law enforcement); Matthew Doktor, Facial Recognition and the
Fourth Amendment in the Wake of Carpenter v. United States, 89 U. CIN. L. REV. 552 (2021) (discussing
the Court’s extension of Fourth Amendment privacy rights to modern law enforcement technology).
Civil society also raised alarm bells over the corporate use of face recognition to surveil Black tenants
in rent-controlled buildings. See Tranae’ Moran, Fabian Rogers & Mona Patel, Tenants Against Facial
Recognition: AI Now 2019 Symposium, YOUTUBE (Oct. 15, 2019), https://youtu.be/7VUAdVrkFuw
[https://perma.cc/FUA7-SERF]; Tranae’ Moran, Atlantic Plaza Towers Tenants Won a Halt to Facial
Recognition in Their Building: Now They’re Calling on a Moratorium on All Residential Use, MEDIUM (Jan.
9, 2020), https://medium.com/@AINowInstitute/atlantic-plaza-towers-tenants-won-a-halt-to-facialrecognition-in-their-building-now-theyre-274289a6d8eb [https://perma.cc/A6Z6-WURK]; see also
Ginia Bellafante, The Landlord Wants Facial Recognition in Its Rent-Stabilized Buildings. Why?, N.Y.
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rise of business models premised on turning publicly available information into
corporate assets.16 Helen Nissenbaum urged that definitions of privacy could
not discount protecting “vast stores of information—even so-called ‘public’
information” used to surveil people, and Joel Reidenberg predicted that face
recognition would create confusion about the “appropriate treatment of publicly
available personal information.”17 Evan Selinger and Woodrow Hartzog
concluded that the confusion is settled, putting the current calculus bluntly:
“[F]acial recognition technology is the most uniquely dangerous surveillance
mechanism ever invented.”18 Other scholars—including legal scholars Danielle
Citron, Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya, Margaret Hu, Ari Waldman, Rashida
Richardson, Laura Moy, and Vincent Southerland and sociotechnical scholars
Safia Umoja Noble, Virginia Eubanks, and Ruha Benjamin—have long
established that the burdens of biased algorithms are borne by marginalized
people.19
TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/nyregion/rent-stabilized-buildingsfacial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/Z723-XP6C (dark archive)]. Thanks to Megan Graham for
highlighting the residential use of face surveillance.
16. See Julie E. Cohen, The Biopolitical Public Domain: The Legal Construction of the Surveillance
Economy, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 213, 213 (2018); see also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is for, 126 HARV. L.
REV. 1904, 1921–27 (2013).
17. Helen Nissenbaum, Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information
Technology, 7 ETHICS & BEHAV. 207, 208 (1997); Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIA. L.
REV. 141, 142 (2014).
18. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression,
MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-foroppression-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/75PM-XMJ7 (dark archive)]; see also Evan Selinger &
Woodrow Hartzog, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66 LOY. L. REV. 33 (2020). Luke Stark
has compared the technology to plutonium, explaining that “[i]t’s dangerous, racializing, and has few
legitimate uses” requiring “regulation and control on par with nuclear waste.” Luke Stark, Facial
Recognition Is the Plutonium of AI, 25 XRDS, Spring 2019, at 50, 50.
19. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256
(2008) (providing an example of how biased algorithms disproportionately affect poor people);
Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89
WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (marginalized people); Clare Garvie, Alvaro Bedoya & Jonathan Frankle,
Unregulated Police Face Recognition in America, PERPETUAL LINE-UP (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.
perpetuallineup.org/findings/racial-bias [https://perma.cc/8HJX-UYDF] (women of color); Solon
Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (protected
classes under Title VII); ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING:
SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) (people of color);
Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017) (people of color); Amanda
Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L.
REV. 579 (2018) [hereinafter Levendowski, Copyright Law] (women, people of color, and queer people);
Ari Ezra Waldman, Power, Process, and Automated Decision-Making, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 613, 622
(2019) (people of color, women, and poor people); Rashida Richardson, Jason M. Schultz & Kate
Crawford, Dirty Data, Bad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact Police Data, Predictive Policing
Systems, and Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 15 (2019) (people of color); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias
In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218 (2019) (people of color); Ifeoma Ajunwa, The Paradox of Automation as
Anti-Bias Intervention, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2020) (women and people of color); Laura M. Moy,
A Taxonomy of Police Technology’s Racial Inequity Problems, U. ILL. L. REV. 139 (2021) (people of color);

100 N.C. L. REV. 1015 (2022)

1020

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

Nearly a decade of scholarship rooted in lived experiences reveals an
urgent need for a federal law banning the use of face surveillance by law
enforcement.20 To be truly effective, a federal ban on face surveillance must
include a ban of private face recognition technologies that directly or indirectly
support law enforcement investigations—which, at some level, may be all of
them.21 But waiting for such legislation is a luxury few can afford.22 This Article
argues that there is previously unexplored law that could be used to resist
invasive face surveillance in the meantime: copyright law. Photographs used as
profile pictures, both on social media networks and other websites, are
protectable by copyright, and the unauthorized copies created and reproduced
by some face recognition companies constitute copyright infringement barring
an exception.23
This Article seeks to answer Jeanne Fromer’s thoughtful question of
whether we should care why intellectual property rights are asserted.24 Part I
Vincent M. Southerland, The Intersection of Race and Algorithmic Tools in the Criminal Legal System, 80
MD. L. REV. 487 (2021) (people of color); Ngozi Okidegbe, Discredited Data, 107 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (poor people and people of color). For sociotechnical explorations of algorithmic
bias, see CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (women, people of color, and poor people);
Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, SIGNIFICANCE, Oct. 2016, at 14 (people of color);
SAFIA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE
RACISM (2018) (women and people of color); MEREDITH BROUSSARD, ARTIFICIAL
UNINTELLIGENCE: HOW COMPUTERS MISUNDERSTAND THE WORLD (2018) (poor people and
people of color); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018) (poor people); RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER
TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR THE NEW JIM CODE (2019) (people of color); Joy
Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender
Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 77 (2018) (women and people of color); Inioluwa
Deborah Raji & Joy Buolamwini, Actionable Auditing: Investigating the Impact of Publicly Naming Biased
Performance Results of Commercial AI Products, 2019 CONF. ON A.I. ETHICS & SOC. 429 (women and
people of color). Algorithmic bias in face recognition technology is also central in the documentary
film CODED BIAS (7th Empire Media 2020).
20. This echoes the ask to the Biden administration made by thirty social justice organizations in
December 2020. Dean DeChiaro, Advocates To Press Biden, Congress on Facial Recognition Curbs, ROLL
CALL (Dec. 8, 2020, 6:30 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/12/08/advocates-to-press-bidencongress-on-facial-recognition-curbs/ [https://perma.cc/H67E-YVDS]. The urgent need for a federal
bill is not news to Congress. See infra Section II.B.
21. For an in-depth discussion of how private surveillance technologies can prove just as
problematic as law enforcement surveillance technologies, see generally Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue
Influence of Surveillance Technology Companies on Policing, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 19 (2017).
22. More than 117 million adults are believed to be in face recognition databases. Garvie et al.,
supra note 19.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (a)(5) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . . Works of authorship include . . . pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works . . . .”); id. § 106 (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords . . . .”).
24. Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 32
HOUS. L. REV. 549, 549 (2015).
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traces the injustices of face surveillance through two of its baked-in biases—
demographic biases affecting the accuracy of face analysis technology and
deployment biases driving its use against marginalized communities—to
establish the urgency of thinking creatively about combatting face surveillance.
As Part II explains, existing approaches to resisting face recognition, including
awaiting corporations to stop selling face surveillance technology to law
enforcement or pursuing local legislation banning or regulating the technology,
require vast shifts in practical or political will, each with its own drawbacks.25
While we wait, face surveillance becomes more entrenched in society, which is
why Part III explores how existing copyright law could provide a desperately
necessary fix. Part III outlines the contours of copyright infringement litigation
and analyzes why fair use—the key infringement exception—may not apply to
face surveillance companies’ practice of copying profile pictures to use as face
surveillance training data and reproducing those photographs in face match
reports used by law enforcement. Lawsuits over machine learning (“ML”), like
face surveillance, will draw out the full complexities of the fair use doctrine, and
many uses of copyrighted works as training data will be fair use.26 But face
surveillance may be the exception to the rule that ML is fair use.
This Article should not need to exist. Not all privacy issues are copyright
ones—and they should not be.27 But decades of lobbying created a Congress
that cares more about conserving copyrights than protecting privacy,28 and the
25. Others have pursued creative litigation. The Vermont Attorney General is suing Clearview
AI for violation of its unfair and deceptive acts or practices act. Complaint at 1, State v. Clearview AI,
Inc., No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2020) [hereinafter Vermont Clearview AI Complaint];
Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 38, Clearview AI, No. 226-3-20 (Vt. Super. Ct. Sept. 10,
2020) (order granting Clearview AI’s motion to dismiss on two counts and denying motion to dismiss
on all other counts). Additionally, Mijente, NorCal Resist, and four individual plaintiffs are suing
Clearview AI and alleging misappropriation of likeness under California law. Complaint, Renderos v.
Clearview AI, Inc., No. 21-cv-05286 (N.D. Ill. filed Mar. 9, 2021, in Cal. Super. Ct. as No.
RG21091138) [hereinafter Renderos Complaint].
26. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 619–30; Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey,
Fair Learning, 99 TEX. L. REV. 743, 748–49 (2021). But see Benjamin L.W. Sobel, Artificial Intelligence’s
Fair Use Crisis, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 45, 45–46 (2017) (observing that invoking fair use for fairer
ML may have costs, such as shifting valuable innovation elsewhere or diverting earnings away from
authors).
27. Compare Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (attempting to distort copyright
law to shield actor from displaying her performance in a public film), with Complaint, Jane Doe v.
Elam, No. 14-cv-09788 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2014) (invoking existing copyright law to sue persistent
distributor of nonconsensual pornography). Jane Doe was awarded $450,000 for copyright
infringement, part of the largest judgment in any nonconsensual pornography case to date. Christine
Hauser, $6.4 Million Judgment in Revenge Porn Case Is Among Largest Ever, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/us/revenge-porn-california.html [https://perma.cc/QU8
L-JC2W (dark archive)].
28. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 19, 61–65 (2017) (detailing lobbying efforts
surrounding copyright term extension); Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things
Happen When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1, 6–10 (2013) (same).
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suggestion that copyright is our best short-term hope at resisting face
recognition technology reveals deep flaws in our legal system that should be
critiqued, not celebrated.29 Ultimately, face recognition by law enforcement
should be eliminated because it poses an existential threat to privacy and
dignity, not because the technology appears to depend on copyright
infringement.30 Yet it does. Until the federal government bans face recognition
software, copyright law may be able to shield us from the most insidious forms
of face surveillance by holding corporate creators civilly liable.31 This Article
concludes that we should care when copyright is weaponized for censorship or
harassment. But if copyright law can curtail face surveillance without waiting
for action from companies or Congress, then we should use it.
I. IDENTIFYING INJUSTICES OF FACE SURVEILLANCE
The algorithms used in every ML system are subject to biases, and the
ones underpinning face surveillance complicate any quest for justice. Multiple
factors play into the biases of algorithms like those behind face surveillance
technology, from homogenous communities of creators and flawed algorithms
to incomplete or mislabeled datasets.32 These problems are so pernicious that
tracks of academic conferences, even entire conferences themselves, are
dedicated to the development of “fairer” artificial intelligence (“AI”).33 And
when it comes to face surveillance, these problems are impossible to ignore. The
biases embodied by face surveillance ensure that justice will remain elusive.
29. Indeed, some scholars oppose such an invocation of copyright law. See infra Part III.
30. A similar dynamic was observed with Reddit’s decision to remove the subreddits trafficking
in hacked nonconsensual pornography of celebrity women in response to copyright takedown notices
rather than doing so out of respect for the victims’ privacy and dignity. Sarah Jeong, Reddit as a
Government, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2014, 3:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahjeong/2014/09/08/
reddit-as-a-government/?sh=6fd7c8d1856d [https://perma.cc/RG63-GJYL (dark archive)].
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (providing statutory damages for infringement). It is no surprise
that copyright law is, in the words of Cathay Smith, a tool “par excellence.” Cathay Y.N. Smith,
Weaponizing Copyright, 35 HARV. J.L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 34) [hereinafter
Smith, Weaponizing Copyright], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3806015 [https://
perma.cc/6WC4-3U5Q].
32. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 583–85. For a foundational discussion of
bias in computer systems, see generally Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems,
14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330 (1996).
33. See, e.g., ACM CONF. ON FAIRNESS ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY (ACM FACCT),
https://facctconference.org/ [https://perma.cc/9SEU-G7EY]. “Fairness” also occupies an outsized
focus in scholarship. See, e.g., KIMMO KÄRKKÄINEN & JUNGSEOCK JOO, FAIRFACE: FACE
ATTRIBUTE DATASET FOR BALANCED RACE, GENDER, AND AGE FOR BIAS MEASUREMENT AND
MITIGATION 2–3 (2019), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.04913.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WZ3-BV8P]
(creating a “fair” dataset treating “Latino [as] a race, which can be judged from the facial appearance”
and including only binary genders). Crucially, no one can quite agree on what “fairness” means. Arvind
Narayanan, Tutorial: 21 Fairness Definitions and Their Politics, YOUTUBE (2018), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=jIXIuYdnyyk [https://perma.cc/U9SR-2M3Q] (describing definitions of fairness at the
2018 ACM FAT* Conference). FAT* is the predecessor of FAccT.
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The literal lens through which we view faces has always been biased. When
photography became popularized in the 1950s, Black parents found that the
photographs reduced their children to “ink blots.”34 Erasing the visibility of
Black subjects was done by design. At Kodak Eastman, a model on staff named
Shirley became the metric for calibrating the printed color stock used by
cameras.35 Kodak photographed Shirley against bland backgrounds with bright
lighting to determine how skin would look in high-contrast environments.36 Of
course, Shirley was white.37 Kodak only began correcting its cameras’ biases
after receiving complaints—not from Black parents, but from chocolate and
furniture companies saying they “weren’t getting the right brown tones” on
product photographs.38
Today, photographers still struggle to capture Black skin accurately.39 As
Simone Browne details, face scan technology fails “‘very dark-skinned users,’
34. Ainissa Ramirez, How 20th Century Camera Film Captured a Snapshot of American Bias, TIME
(July 24, 2020, 4:44 PM), https://time.com/5871502/film-race-history/ [https://perma.cc/DYE3-P4Z9
(staff-uploaded, dark archive)]. The medium itself betrays systemic biases: the earliest known
photograph of African Americans in the United States depicts enslaved people picking cotton on a
plantation. Brigit Katz, This May Be the Earliest Known Image of Enslaved Individuals with Cotton,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/may-be-earliestknown-image-slaves-cotton-180973705/ [https://perma.cc/86WH-PPVJ].
35. Code Switch, Light and Dark: The Racial Biases That Remain in Photography, NPR (Apr. 16,
2014, 3:35 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/04/16/303721251/light-and-dark-theracial-biases-that-remain-in-photography [https://perma.cc/AX53-45ZE].
36. Id.
37. These cards were known as Shirley Cards, and a multiracial Shirley Card featuring a Black
woman, a white woman, and an Asian woman was not introduced until the mid-1990s. Sarah Lewis,
The Racial Bias Built into Photography, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/
25/lens/sarah-lewis-racial-bias-photography.html [https://perma.cc/5AJF-9GHZ (dark archive)].
38. Id. (quoting Lorna Roth, Looking at Shirley, the Ultimate Norm: Colour Balance, Image
Technologies, and Cognitive Equity, 34 CANADIAN J. COMM. 111, 119 (2009)).
39. Famed photographer Annie Leibovitz and Vogue magazine were criticized for failing to
accurately capture Simone Biles’s skin tone in a recent cover story. See Abby Aguirre, Simone Biles on
Overcoming Abuse, Postponed Olympics, and Training During a Pandemic, VOGUE (July 9,
2020), https://www.vogue.com/article/simone-biles-cover-august-2020 [https://perma.cc/R2SB-MD
7A (dark archive)]; DL Cade, Vogue Slammed for Hiring Annie Leibovitz for Simone Biles Cover Instead of
Black Photographer, PETAPIXEL (July 13, 2020), https://petapixel.com/2020/07/13/vogue-slammed-forhiring-annie-leibovitz-for-simone-biles-cover-instead-of-black-photographer/ [https://perma.cc/DF5
H-4K2G] (sharing critiques from prominent photographers, photo editors, and Black Women
Photographers founder Polly Irungu); Anete Lusina, Vogue and Annie Leibovitz Under Criticism for Badly
Lit Photos of Gymnast Simone Biles, Raising Another Discussion About Lack of Diversity, FSTOPPERS (July
19, 2020), https://fstoppers.com/news/vogue-and-annie-leibovitz-under-criticism-badly-lit-photosgymnast-simone-biles-499513 [https://perma.cc/D3VA-P4DC]. If an artist like Leibovitz cannot get
the lighting right, imagine the challenges with analyzing grainy CCTV footage. But the failure is just
as likely to be user error, as demonstrated by gorgeous cover shoots of Michaela Coel or Viola Davis
by Black photographers. See E. Alex Jung, Michaela the Destroyer, VULTURE (July 6, 2020),
https://www.vulture.com/article/michaela-coel-i-may-destroy-you.html#_ga=2.207146203.992060006
.1618513076-1250292094.1606755378 [https://perma.cc/3HZF-7AAA (staff-uploaded, dark archive)]
(featuring photography by Nigerian photographer Ruth Ossai); Sonia Saraiya, Viola Davis: “My Entire
Life Has Been a Protest,” VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2020), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2020/07/
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not due to ‘lack of distinctive features, of course, but to the quality of the images
provided to the facial-scan system by video cameras optimized for lighterskinned users.’”40 Similarly, face detection systems built into cameras struggle
to recognize Black skin at all. Less than five years ago, Hewlett-Packard was
taken to task for developing a face detection algorithm that worked seamlessly
for white people but failed to track Black people entirely.41 Today, face
surveillance renders people of color invisible when they benefit from it but
hypervisible when law enforcement can.42
As Laura Moy has thoughtfully taxonomized, police technology—like face
surveillance—is developed and deployed against a backdrop of biases that can
replicate, mask, transfer, and exacerbate inequity in policing, as well as
compromise oversight of that inequity.43 Historically, two white men working
for law enforcement pioneered face recognition by relying on photographs of
arrested men—commonly known as mugshots—to develop their
methodologies.44 Arrested men became training data without their consent, an
cover-story-viola-davis [https://perma.cc/YCJ5-LMDR (dark archive)] (featuring photography by
African American photographer Dario Calmese, the first Black photographer to shoot a cover for Vanity
Fair). In the television realm, Issa Rae’s series Insecure has won awards for its lighting of Black skin.
How ‘Insecure’ Lights Its Actors So Well, MIC (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.facebook.com/micmedia/
videos/1644358292253621 [https://perma.cc/VM2P-AV6D]; see also Nadia Latif, It’s Lit! How Film
Finally Learned To Light Black Skin, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017, 12:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/film/2017/sep/21/its-lit-how-film-finally-learned-how-to-light-black-skin [https://perma.cc/ASC
7-E6WT (staff-uploaded, dark archive)]. For a first-person account of cameras’ bias, see Syreeta
McFadden, Teaching the Camera To See My Skin, BUZZFEED (Apr. 2, 2014, 8:01 PM), https://www.buzz
feednews.com/article/syreetamcfadden/teaching-the-camera-to-see-my-skin [https://perma.cc/ZU8AV3UA].
40. SIMONE BROWNE, DARK MATTERS: ON THE SURVEILLANCE OF BLACKNESS 113 (2015)
(quoting SAMIR NANAVATI, MICHAEL THIEME & RAJ NANAVATI, BIOMETRICS: IDENTITY
VERIFICATION IN A NETWORKED WORLD 37 (2002)).
41. wzamen01, HP Computers Are Racist, YOUTUBE (Dec. 10, 2009), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=t4DT3tQqgRM&feature=youtu.be [https://perma.cc/U8P9-VBPU]. This same sort of
algorithmic invisibility inspired Joy Buolamwini to pioneer the Algorithmic Justice League. CODED
BIAS (7th Empire Media 2020).
42. For a discussion of the relationship between photography and Blackness, see Ainissa G.
Ramirez, Black Images Matter: How Cameras Helped—and Sometimes Harmed—Black People, SCI. AM.
(July 8, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/black-images-matter-how-cameras-helpedmdash-and-sometimes-harmed-mdash-black-people/ [https://perma.cc/XCF5-2KYG (staff-uploaded,
dark archive)]. Cameras have failed people of color as an accountability mechanism for law
enforcement, as evidenced by the ways that body-worn camera footage and videos of police brutality
fail to translate into meaningful accountability. See id.
43. Moy, supra note 19, at 143–44.
44. The men were Alphonse Bertillon, a Parisian police officer who invented mugshots in the
nineteenth century, and Woody Bledsoe, a Ph.D. graduate working in Silicon Valley who pioneered
computerized face recognition on behalf of law enforcement in the 1960s. See Hansi Lo Wang, Meet
Alphonse Bertillon, the Man Behind the Modern Mug Shot, NPR (Mar. 8, 2016, 6:21 PM), https://www.
npr.org/2016/03/08/469174753/meet-alphonse-bertillon-the-man-behind-the-modern-mug-shot [http
://perma.cc/NS6B-QBBD]; Sahil Chinov, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES
(July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.html [https://
perma.cc/5LED-DB6B (dark archive)] (describing Bertillon as a “facial analysis pioneer”). For a
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objection levied against some of the most prolific datasets in face recognition
today.45 As a result, face recognition is inextricably coupled with lack of consent
and perceived criminality.46
This part explores two of the contemporary biases that animate face
recognition: demographic and deployment biases. Demographically, face
recognition reflects and amplifies the biases of the camera itself. Study after
study across different forms of face surveillance—including face
characterization and face recognition—demonstrate empirically that face
surveillance performs poorly for people of color, women, and young people, and
it often excludes or misgenders transgender and nonbinary people.47 But fixing
demographic biases cannot fix face recognition. Even if face recognition was
accurate, past and present practices show us that face surveillance will be
deployed disproportionately against marginalized people.48 Even when face
recognition is sometimes turned on the powerful,49 people of color, immigrants,
and sex workers remain persistent targets of the technology.50
Technology that creates a more efficient carceral system should be
resisted. The imbalanced power dynamics inherent in face surveillance’s
demographic and deployment biases suggest that the technology can solve

history of how these men’s work contributed to face surveillance’s flaws, see Amanda Levendowski,
Face Surveillance Was Always Flawed, PUB. BOOKS (Nov. 30, 2021), https://www.publicbooks.org/facesurveillance-was-always-flawed/ [https://perma.cc/7HWM-TTY4] [hereinafter Levendowski, Face
Surveillance Was Always Flawed].
45. For deeper discussion, see infra Part III. See also Levendowski, Face Surveillance Was Always
Flawed, supra note 44.
46. See Okidegbe, supra note 19, at 1–8.
47. See, e.g., PATRICK GROTHER, MEI NGAN & KAYEE HANAOKA, NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST (FRVT) PART 3: DEMOGRAPHIC
EFFECTS 2–3 (2019), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/NIST.IR.8280.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6S4R-WUWZ]; Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 19, at 88. For an explanation of intersectionality, see
Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139. See also
PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 225 (1990) (“Replacing additive models of oppression with interlocking
ones creates possibilities for new paradigms. The significance of seeing race, class, and gender as
interlocking systems of oppression is that such an approach fosters a paradigmatic shift of thinking
inclusively about other oppressions, such as age, sexual orientation, religion, and ethnicity.”).
48. See generally Damien Patrick Williams, Fitting the Description: Historical and Sociotechnical
Elements of Facial Recognition and Anti-Black Surveillance, 7 J. RESPONSIBLE INNOVATION 74 (2020)
(explaining how surveillance tools are “inextricably bound up with a history of racialized inequality”).
49. Kashmir Hill, Activists Turn Facial Recognition Tools Against the Police, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/technology/facial-recognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/Y
FV7-8KFQ (dark archive)] (Aug. 1, 2021) [hereinafter Hill, Activists Turn Facial Recognition]; Joan
Donovan & Chris Gilliard, Facial Recognition Technology Isn’t Good Just Because It’s Used To Arrest NeoNazis, SLATE (Jan. 12, 2021, 12:54 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2021/01/facial-recognitiontechnology-capitol-siege.html [https://perma.cc/J46C-JVXA].
50. See infra Section I.B.
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crimes without necessarily promoting justice. These injustices inherent in face
surveillance reveal why we should think creatively about countering its use.
A.

Demographic Biases

A year before Williams’ arrest in Detroit, Nijeer Parks spent ten days in a
New Jersey jail after he was wrongly accused based on a flawed face recognition
match.51 When presented with the fake driver’s license that generated the
match, Parks said, “I don’t think he looks like me. . . . The only thing we have
in common is the beard.”52 That same year, back in Detroit, Michael Oliver was
also wrongly arrested.53 To date, all three of the publicly disclosed victims of
mistaken law enforcement face recognition matches are Black men.54
The men wrongfully identified as criminals by face recognition algorithms
are not the only examples of the automated facial analysis technology betraying
people of color.55 The landmark “Gender Shades” study conducted by Joy
Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru shed light on the vastness of intersectional,
automated face analysis biases.56 Rather than use an existing dataset, the
researchers developed the Pilot Parliaments Benchmark, a new dataset
comprised of photographs of male and female politicians from six countries to
measure the performance of Microsoft, Face++, and IBM face recognition
algorithms.57 The politicians were identified in four intersectional categories:
darker-skinned males, lighter-skinned males, darker-skinned females, and
51. Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Face Recognition Match, N.Y.
TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html
[https://perma.cc/2XCN-JC6K (dark archive)] (Jan. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Hill, Another Arrest];
Anthony G. Attrino, He Spent 10 Days in Jail After Facial Recognition Software Led to the Arrest of the
Wrong Man, Lawsuit Says, NJ.COM, https://www.nj.com/middlesex/2020/12/he-spent-10-days-in-jailafter-facial-recognition-software-led-to-the-arrest-of-the-wrong-man-lawsuit-says.html [http://perma.
cc/MK73-M66W (dark archive)] (Dec. 29, 2020, 1:40 PM). Parks is currently suing the mayor, director
of the police department, several officers, and the acting prosecutor of Middlesex County, New Jersey.
Complaint, Parks v. McCormack, No. 21-cv-04021 (D.N.J. filed Nov. 25, 2020, in N.J. Super. Ct. as
No. L-003672-20).
52. Hill, Another Arrest, supra note 51.
53. Elisha Anderson, Controversial Detroit Facial Recognition Got Him Arrested for a Crime He Didn’t
Commit, DETROIT FREE PRESS, https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/07/
10/facial-recognition-detroit-michael-oliver-robert-williams/5392166002/ [https://perma.cc/VC7Z-R
HSV (dark archive)] (July 11, 2020, 11:03 PM). Oliver is also suing the City of Detroit over his
wrongful arrest. Oliver v. Bussa, No. 20-011495-NO (Mich. Cir. Ct. Sept. 4, 2020).
54. Hill, Another Arrest, supra note 51.
55. See supra Introduction.
56. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 19. In 2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation found that
multiple face recognition algorithms struggled to identify Black faces, young faces, and women’s faces.
Brendan F. Klare, Mark J. Burge, Joshua C. Klontz, Richard W. Vorder Bruegge & Anil K. Jain, Face
Recognition Performance: Role of Demographic Information, 7 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFO.
FORENSICS & SEC. 1789, 1800 (2012).
57. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 19, at 81, 85 tbl.4. Notably, these features were chosen
because it ensured that the subjects were “public figures with known identities and photos available
under non-restrictive licenses posted on government websites.” Id. at 81.
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lighter-skinned females.58 Consistently, the algorithms performed worst on
darker-skinned females, with error rates approaching nearly thirty-five percent
higher than those for lighter-skinned males.59 Inioluwa Deborah Raji and
Buolamwini performed a reaudit of the first batch of companies and added new
algorithms.60 Their research found that the initially targeted companies all
reduced accuracy disparities, but the newly studied companies persisted in
performing poorly for darker-skinned females.61
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) confirmed
the Gender Shades findings in a follow-up study. NIST tested 189 algorithms
from 99 developers, including commercial developers like Microsoft and law
enforcement contractors like Vigilant Solutions.62 As one of the researchers put
it, “[I]t is usually incorrect to make statements across algorithms, [but] we found
empirical evidence for the existence of demographic differentials in the majority
of the face recognition algorithms we studied . . . .”63 Those differentials were
stark. For 1:N matching, which compares features from a search image with all
other possibilities in the gallery and is used in most face recognition systems,
false positives were elevated for West African, East African, and East Asian
people, alongside—though at a slightly lower rate—South Asian and Central

58. Id. at 83 tbl.2. The researchers used a skin tone classification methodology developed by a
dermatologist. Id. at 82.
59. Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, If You’re a White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/5G9W-7CJW (dark archive)]. Microsoft and IBM responded by tweaking their
algorithms. See John Roach, Microsoft Improves Facial Recognition Technology To Perform Well Across All
Skin Tones, Genders, MICROSOFT: A.I. BLOG (June 26, 2018), https://blogs.microsoft.com/ai/genderskin-tone-facial-recognition-improvement/ [https://perma.cc/A6A2-TQCS]; IBM, IBM RESPONSE
TO “GENDER SHADES: INTERSECTIONAL ACCURACY DISPARITIES IN COMMERCIAL GENDER
CLASSIFICATION” (2018), http://gendershades.org/docs/ibm.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7GU-RFHS].
60. Raji & Buolamwini, supra note 19.
61. Id. In AI, Ain’t I a Woman, Buolamwini shows that commercial face recognition misgenders
former First Lady Michelle Obama as a man. Joy Buolamwini, AI, Ain’t I a Woman, YOUTUBE (June
28, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxuyfWoVV98 [https://perma.cc/Z9KR-E3YF].
62. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 47, at 1, 26 tbl.5, 27 tbl.6. NIST was urged to conduct such a
study by researchers at the Center for Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law. See Garvie et al.,
supra note 19, at 6. The results echoed an earlier study, which found that face recognition systems
demonstrated bias against women, Black people, and younger people. See Klare et al., supra note 56, at
1789.
63. NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face Recognition Software, NAT’L INST.
STANDARDS & TECH. (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-studyevaluates-effects-race-age-sex-face-recognition-software [https://perma.cc/48ME-F3WC]. Note that
the NIST study used race rather than skin color. Id.
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American people.64 The lowest rate of false positives was for East European
people.65
While the Gender Shades and NIST studies both revealed intersectional
biases most affecting dark-skinned women, neither fully captured the extent of
face analysis biases because both suffered from a shared shortcoming: use of
binary gender. Gender Shades acknowledged expressly that “[t]his reductionist
view of gender does not adequately capture the complexities of gender or
address transgender identities,” nor nonbinary ones.66 Face recognition
technology was not developed with trans and nonbinary faces in mind. In
decades of research in the field, only a few leading scholarly papers acknowledge
the existence of trans people and none mention nonbinary people.67 Face
recognition technology—including from major commercial developers such as
IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon—misgenders trans people and simply cannot
identify nonbinary people more than one-third of the time.68
When people cannot trust the accuracy of technology, these biases have
practical effects. A Utah DMV employee forced a trans woman to remove her
makeup out of concern that her appearance would create problems for face
recognition.69 Attempting to verify its drivers, Uber used Microsoft face
recognition technology that failed to identify trans drivers and effectively

64. Id. The higher false positive rates for people of color were among algorithms developed in the
United States, with American Indians (identified as a subset of Native faces) reflecting the highest rate
of false positives. Id. A Federal Bureau of Investigation study likewise found that face recognition
algorithms are least accurate for people of color, women, and young people. Klare et al., supra note 56,
at 1800. Much face surveillance research, including the NIST study, also assumes and reifies the
existence of “race” without interrogating its social construction. Alex Hanna, Emily Denton, Andrew
Smart & Jamila Smith-Loud, Towards a Critical Race Methodology in Algorithmic Fairness, 2020 CONF.
ON FAIRNESS ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 501, 501.
65. GROTHER ET AL., supra note 47, at 2. It is worth noting that several developers’ systems had
virtually undetectable false-positive differentials, including Idemia and NEC-3, among several others.
Id. at 8.
66. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 19, at 82; see also SARAH MYERS WEST, MEREDITH
WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, AI NOW INST. DISCRIMINATING SYSTEMS: GENDER, RACE,
AND POWER IN AI 17 (2019), https://ainowinstitute.org/discriminatingsystems.pdf [https://perma.
cc/UJ8J-L3LJ] (explaining that the gender classification in the Gender Shades study presented several
problems, one of which was the study’s assumption that gender can be detected automatically).
67. See, e.g., Ari Schlesinger, W. Keith Edwards & Rebecca E. Grinter, Intersectional HCI:
Engaging Identity Through Gender, Race, and Class, PROC. 2017 CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYS. 5412; Os Keyes, The Misgendering Machines: Trans/HCI Implications of Automatic
Gender Recognition, 2 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 88:1 (2018).
68. The study also looked at Clarifai. Morgan Klaus Scheuerman, Jacob M. Paul & Jed R.
Brubaker, How Computers See Gender: An Evaluation of Gender Classification in Commercial Facial Analysis
and Image Labeling Services, 3 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUT. INTERACTION 144:1, 144:8 (2019).
69. Sonia K. Katyal & Jessica Y. Jung, The Gender Panopticon: Artificial Intelligence, Gender, and
Design Justice, 68 UCLA L. REV. 692, 715 (2021). The concept of the “panopticon” is rooted in racist
surveillance—Jeremy Bentham was inspired by the construction of a slave ship when conceptualizing
it. See BROWNE, supra note 40, at 31–32.
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locked them out of their accounts.70 Other uses of gender-identifying face
recognition technology include “real-time security, targeted marketing, and
personalized human-robot interaction.”71 But even expanding face surveillance
data labeling beyond binary gender may not be enough. Morgan Klaus
Scheuerman’s work examining issues of incorporating binary gender into face
recognition technology curated a dataset of seven genders, including
“genderless ‘genders.’”72 That work acknowledged that “there is boundless
opportunity to include other genders in computer vision research” and
recognized that these technologies still “require[] assumptions to be made about
gender identity and pronouns” based on images alone.73 And those assumptions
are likely to be flawed.
Perversely, developers’, researchers’, and even auditors’ attempts at
correcting face recognition bias against trans and nonbinary people can
perpetuate harm against the people they are trying to protect.74 One researcher
notoriously sought to develop a face recognition system using transition videos
scraped from YouTube, a privacy invasion to which many scholars and subjects
objected.75 Anna Lauren Hoffman puts it plainly: inclusion can work to
normalize oppression.76 If the answer to correcting demographic bias in face
surveillance requires strategic, expanded inclusion of people of color, women,
trans, and nonbinary people in face recognition databases, then we must ask a
different question.
B.

Deployment Biases

Some people may believe that the use of face recognition by law
enforcement would be acceptable if the technology were less demographically
biased. But law enforcement would still deploy face recognition technology
70. John Riley, Transgender Uber Drivers Say App’s New Security Features Are Getting Them
Suspended, METROWEEKLY (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.metroweekly.com/2018/08/transgenderuber-drivers-app-security-features-get-suspended/ [https://perma.cc/SG29-M6DG].
71. Scheuerman et al., supra note 68, at 144:6.
72. Id. at 144:26.
73. Id.
74. Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Timnit Gebru, Margaret Mitchell, Joy Buolamwini, Joonseok Lee &
Emily Denton, Saving Face: Investigating the Ethical Concerns of Facial Recognition Auditing, 2020
AAAI/ACM A.I. ETHICS & SOC’Y CONF. 145, 147 (noting these attempts “can promote gender
stereotypes, [be] . . . exclusionary of transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming individuals,
and threaten[] further harm against already marginalized individuals” (internal citations omitted)). For
a critical discussion of transgender politics and surveillance practices, see generally TOBY
BEAUCHAMP, GOING STEALTH (2019).
75. See James Vincent, Transgender YouTubers Had Their Videos Grabbed To Train Facial Recognition
Software, VERGE (Aug. 22, 2017, 10:44 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/22/16180080/
transgender-youtubers-ai-facial-recognition-dataset [https://perma.cc/DAF7-HZCK].
76. See Anna Lauren Hoffman, Terms of Inclusion: Data, Discourse, Violence, 23 NEW MEDIA &
SOC’Y 3539, 3539 (2021). But see Lemley & Casey, supra note 26, at 771 (“The solution is to build bigger
databases overall or to ‘oversample’ members of smaller groups.”).
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against marginalized people with minimal oversight and limited means of
recourse. Weaponizing surveillance technologies, such as face surveillance,
against marginalized communities renders their movements hypervisible to law
enforcement.77 This has been the case for centuries. Simone Browne has detailed
disparate surveillance dating to when states enforced so-called lantern laws that
required Black and Native people to carry lit candles at night, illuminating
themselves to the white gaze.78 “Black luminosity,” she says, worked as a “form
of boundary maintenance occurring at the site of the black body, whether by
candlelight, flaming torch, or the camera flashbulb that documents the ritualized
terror of a lynch mob.”79 Little has changed. As the Fourth Circuit recently
observed, “[T]echnology ‘allow[s] government watchers to remain unobtrusive,’
[but] the impact of surveillance ‘[is] conspicuous in the lives of those least
empowered to object.’”80 The court continued, “Because those communities are
over-surveilled, they tend to be over-policed, resulting in inflated arrest rates
and increased exposure to incidents of police violence.”81 People of color remain
up to two-and-a-half times more likely to be targets of police surveillance.82 And
face recognition is deployed strategically against marginalized people, including
people of color, immigrants, and sex workers, with minimal regulation,
oversight, or accountability.83 As poet and activist Malkia Devich-Cyril warned,
“[F]acial-recognition . . . [will] be used to supercharge police abuses of power
and worsen racial discrimination.”84

77. See, e.g., Color of Surveillance, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (2019), https://www.law.
georgetown.edu/privacy-technology-center/events/color-of-surveillance-2019/ [https://perma.cc/N5F
7-5WKN] (documenting the past, present, and future of surveillance against marginalized
communities, including Black people, immigrants, religious minorities, and poor people); Richardson
et al., supra note 19, at 45.
78. See BROWNE, supra note 40, at 76–80.
79. Id. at 67; see also Brandi Thompson Summers, Black Lives Under Surveillance, PUB. BOOKS
(Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.publicbooks.org/black-lives-under-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/YYV82EKD] (“Today, poor communities of color are under constant surveillance and on the receiving end
of brutal market forces.”).
80. Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Balt. Police Dep’t, 2 F.4th 330, 347 (4th Cir. 2021) (en
banc) (quoting BARTON GELLMAN & SAM ADLER-BELL, CENTURY FOUND., THE DISPARATE
IMPACT OF SURVEILLANCE 2 (2017), https://production-tcf.imgix.net/app/uploads/2017/12/03151009
/the-disparate-impact-of-surveillance.pdf [https://perma.cc/2869-QUAC]).
81. Id.
82. Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have Racial Bias Problem,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlyingbias-of-facial-recognition-systems/476991/ [https://perma.cc/QW9G-DBL7 (dark archive)]. This
overrepresentation plays out in mugshot databases used by face recognition technology. Id.
83. Williams, supra note 48, at 77–80.
84. Malkia Devich-Cyril, Defund Facial Recognition, ATLANTIC (July 5, 2020), https://www.the
atlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/defund-facial-recognition/613771/ [https://perma.cc/8L9UUFA9 (dark archive)].
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The New York Police Department (“NYPD”) provides one example of
law enforcement’s history with face surveillance deployment biases.85 After
9/11, the NYPD dusted downtown Manhattan with thousands of surveillance
cameras and later consolidated video surveillance operations into a centralized
command center.86 In 2012, the NYPD began working with IBM to take
surveillance footage from across the city and transform it into an effective face
recognition system, integrating its system with more than five hundred
cameras.87 IBM developed new search features for the NYPD that allowed it to
search by features like hair color, facial hair—and, most notably, skin tone.88
Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that the NYPD also has a record of misusing face
recognition technology against people of color.89 Last summer, the NYPD
admitted to using face recognition to surveil Black Lives Matter activist Derrick
Ingram, despite public representations that the department “does not use facial
recognition technology to monitor and identify people in crowds or political
rallies.”90 Even if the technology were less demographically biased, history
suggests that it would still be disproportionately focused on people of color.
The arrests of Williams and Oliver put these practices into stark relief
beyond New York. Both Black men were arrested in Detroit, a city that is
seventy-eight percent Black.91 In the wake of their arrests, the Detroit Police
Chief admitted that the department’s face recognition technology misidentified
suspects “about 96 percent of the time.”92 Yet despite known demographic
biases, particularly for people of color, the department has not retired face
recognition technology. Instead, Detroit doubled down and invested in a
million-dollar system called Project Green Light that empowers police to scan

85. The public has little say in the acquisition and deployment of surveillance systems in most
jurisdictions, as documented by Crump, supra note 9, at 1655, and Joh, supra note 21, at 20, 22, 37.
86. See James Vincent, IBM Secretly Used New York’s CCTV Cameras To Train Its Surveillance
Software, VERGE (Sept. 6, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/9/6/17826446/ibmvideo-surveillance-nypd-cctv-cameras-search-skin-tone [https://perma.cc/2NWM-3C9M].
87. See id.
88. Despite developing the skin tone feature and providing officers with the skin tone search tool,
an NYPD spokesperson claimed the NYPD declined an offer to use the feature. See id.
89. See Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out: Face Recognition on Flawed Data, GEO. L. CTR. ON
PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com [https://perma.cc/74X3-FV3G]
(detailing NYPD use of a photograph of actor Woody Harrelson, famed for his role in Cheers and more
recently the dystopian series The Hunger Games, as a substitute for a suspect’s image).
90. Sidney Fussell, The Next Target for a Facial Recognition Ban? New York, WIRED (Jan. 28, 2021,
8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/next-target-facial-recognition-ban-new-york/ [http://perma.
cc/R6EM-2SHA (dark archive)].
91. Detroit City, Michigan; Michigan, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/detroitcitymichigan,MI/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/W7GM-62Y7].
92. Timothy B. Lee, Detroit Police Chief Cops to 96-Percent Facial Recognition Error Rate, ARS
TECHNICA (June 30, 2020, 12:12 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2020/06/detroit-policechief-admits-facial-recognition-is-wrong-96-of-the-time/ [https://perma.cc/NAG9-49GU].
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live surveillance video from cameras across the city, from businesses and schools
to hospitals and apartment buildings.93
Law enforcement also deploys face recognition technology to target
immigrants. In 2019, Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy & Technology
revealed through disclosed documents that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) transformed state
driver’s license databases into routine immigration investigative tools.94 More
than a dozen states, including Utah, Vermont, and Washington, offer driver’s
licenses or driving privilege cards to undocumented immigrants.95 According to
records requests, ICE agents worked with state officials to run face recognition
searches using those databases.96 Searches were rarely accompanied by warrants
or subpoenas, with some searches run using nothing more than an email
attaching an investigative photograph, or “probe photo,” of the target.97 The
revelation marked the first known instance of ICE deploying face recognition
technology on state driver’s license databases.98 Alvaro Bedoya, the former
director of Georgetown Law’s Center on Privacy and Technology, explained
that “this is a scandal, and a huge betrayal of undocumented people . . . . [ICE
agents are] actually taking advantage of that [licensure] to secretly find and
deport those people using face recognition technology . . . .”99 In Maryland,
another state that offers driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants, ICE ran
face recognition searches on millions of photos without state or court
approval.100 Unlike prior cases, in which ICE requested state officials to run
searches, ICE officials nationwide searched Maryland driver’s license databases
93. Clare Garvie & Laura M. Moy, America Under Watch: Face Surveillance in the United States,
GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIV. & TECH. (May 16, 2019), https://www.americaunderwatch.com/
[https://perma.cc/L3DY-5NRK]. Detroit’s surveillance expansion has been resisted vehemently by
local activists. See Tawana Petty, Defending Black Lives Means Banning Facial Recognition, WIRED (July
10, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/defending-black-lives-means-banning-facialrecognition/ [https://perma.cc/9BFA-Z577 (dark archive)].
94. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are a Gold Mine for Facial-Recognition
Searches, WASH. POST (July 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/07/fbiice-find-state-drivers-license-photos-are-gold-mine-facial-recognition-searches/ [https://perma.cc/77A
7-8E4V (dark archive)].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Catie Edmondson, ICE Used Facial Recognition To Mine State Driver’s License Databases,
N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/07/us/politics/ice-drivers-licensesfacial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/R3B2-AADD (dark archive)].
99. Bill Chappell, ICE Uses Facial Recognition To Sift State Driver’s License Records, Researchers Say,
NPR (July 8, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/08/739491857/ice-uses-facial-recognitionto-sift-state-drivers-license-records-researchers-sa [https://perma.cc/588L-QHZD].
100. See Drew Harwell & Erin Cox, ICE Has Run Facial-Recognition Searches on Millions of Maryland
Drivers, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/02/26/icehas-run-facial-recognition-searches-millions-maryland-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/N734-BZGN (dark
archive)].
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independently without approval or oversight.101 With state legislation on the
horizon banning the practice,102 ICE has opted to contract with a private
subscription service for face recognition “mission support”—Clearview AI.103
Face recognition technology is also turned against sex workers, who have
played an active role in resisting the technology and long occupied the frontiers
of the internet through their communities and work.104 The prominence of sex
workers’ online presence through advertisements, social media, and other
content contributes to their vulnerabilities to surveillance. Their images are
easily accessible which, as activist Danielle Blunt and her coauthors explain,
means that “[s]ex workers are disproportionately . . . used as test subjects for
facial recognition databases.”105 It is easy to run commercial face recognition
technology on videos or photographs of sex workers,106 and it is just as simple
to scrape photos of sex workers and share them with law enforcement.107
101. See id.
102. Kevin Rector, ICE Has Access to Maryland’s Driver’s License Records. State Lawmakers Want To
Limit It., BALT. SUN (Feb. 26, 2020, 6:45 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-md-pol-icemva-bill-20200227-rsgqqajmwne4hollsz4svgpa6m-story.html [https://perma.cc/S5QM-7NMP (dark
archive)].
103. Kim Lyons, ICE Just Signed a Contract with Facial Recognition Company Clearview AI, VERGE,
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/14/21368930/clearview-ai-ice-contract-privacy-immigration [https
://perma.cc/E7TU-4P4V] (Aug. 14, 2020, 3:19 PM).
104. Private face recognition app FindFace was immediately turned against sex workers in Russia.
Jason Abbruzzese, Facial Recognition App Used To Shame Sex Workers in Russia, MASHABLE (May 3,
2016), https://mashable.com/2016/05/03/facial-recognition-russia-shame-sex-workers/ [https://perma.
cc/BF96-666L]. Sex workers successfully advocated for the New Orleans ban of face recognition
technology. See Caroline Sinders, How Musicians and Sex Workers Beat Facial Recognition in New Orleans,
VICE (Mar. 26, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/xgznka/meet-the-musicians-andstrippers-who-beat-facial-recognition-in-new-orleans [https://perma.cc/LH2E-JEE8]; see also Sexual
Gentrification: An Internet Sex Workers Built, HACKING//HUSTLING (Apr. 6, 2021), https://
hackinghustling.org/sexual-gentrification-an-internet-sex-workers-built/ [https://perma.cc/Y84Y-TP
NY] (situating sex workers at the forefront of the internet’s innovations).
105. DANIELLE BLUNT, EMILY COOMBES, SHANELLE MULLIN & ARIEL WOLF,
HACKING//HUSTLING, POSTING INTO THE VOID 7 (2020), https://hackinghustling.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/Posting-Into-the-Void.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ45-F6KL].
106. See, e.g., Abbruzzese, supra note 104 (explaining how running commercial face recognition
technology played out in Russia); Bruce Schneier, Technology To Out Sex Workers, SCHNEIER ON SEC.
(Oct. 13, 2017, 6:57 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/10/technology_to_o.html
[https://perma.cc/75QA-NMBF] (describing a controversial PornHub feature that uses face
recognition algorithms to identify performers); Samantha Cole, DIY Facial Recognition for Porn Is a
Dystopian Disaster, VICE (May 29, 2019, 10:11 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/9kxny7/diyfacial-recognition-for-porn-weibo [https://perma.cc/DW29-TQTW] (reporting an unverified claim
that a German user identified “more than 100,000 young ladies”).
107. Sex Workers Outreach Project Chicago is among the plaintiffs in the ACLU lawsuit
challenging Clearview AI. Complaint at 1, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. May 28, 2020). This may have happened to Amina du Jean, a sex worker who was approached by
Metropolitan Police for a “welfare check.” See Rivkah Brown, How Facial Recognition Is Being Used To
Target Sex Workers, NEW STATESMAN, https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/privacy/2019/05/
how-facial-recognition-being-used-target-sex-workers [https://perma.cc/7VUP-K3E5 (dark archive)]
(Sept. 9, 2021, 3:10 PM).
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Indeed, using sex workers as face recognition test subjects may be the
byproduct of anti-sex-trafficking work by a nonprofit called Thorn.108 Thorn
provides limited details about the operation of its Spotlight tool, which law
enforcement uses.109 But Kate Zen, a community organizer and cofounder of
grassroots sex-worker coalition Red Canary Song, describes the Spotlight tool
as taking “escort ads from various different advertising sites” and providing
Thorn’s partners with copies of the advertisements.110 Thorn uses Amazon
Rekognition, the company’s former face recognition tool, to identify individuals
in the advertisements and work alongside law enforcement to track down hits.111
But Thorn’s approach to collecting advertisements may bundle ads trafficking
children with ads for consensual, adult sex work.112 As a result, sex workers may
be subject to criminal investigation or harassment by law enforcement.113
Even perfect accuracy and procedure cannot salvage the technology.114 The
intractable power biases that animate face surveillance enables invasive privacy
108. See Spotlight, THORN, https://www.thorn.org/spotlight/ [https://perma.cc/XZN2-NJED].
109. See id. The trademark application for the SPOTLIGHT mark describes the tool as “providing
temporary use of non-downloadable software for use in human trafficking investigations; providing
temporary use of non-downloadable software for use in analyzing pattern data in online activity to
detect criminal activity.” SPOTLIGHT, Registration No. 4783591.
110. Erin Taylor, Sex Workers Are at the Forefront of the Fight Against Mass Surveillance and Big Tech,
OBSERVER (Nov. 12, 2019, 10:43 AM), https://observer.com/2019/11/sex-workers-mass-surveillancebig-tech/ [https://perma.cc/H6DB-5RMS]. A former Thorn partner was the controversial surveillance
company and law enforcement contractor Palantir. Id.
111. Amazon, Thorn Uses AWS To Help Law Enforcement Identify Child-Trafficking Victims Faster,
AWS, https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/thorn/ [https://perma.cc/9G26-WHG2].
112. Id. (“One way for law enforcement agents to catch traffickers and rescue kids would be to
identify and investigate escort ads that seem to feature minors . . . .” (emphasis added)). Thorn has
avoided discussing whether such bundling occurs, but the organization has not denied it. Taylor, supra
note 110.
113. Police and other government officials have a history of abusing access to databases for
misogynistic purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1261–62 (11th Cir. 2010)
(dealing with a Social Security Administration employee who used a department database to access exgirlfriend’s personal information sixty-two times, a female ex-coworker’s child’s personal information
twenty-two times, a female restaurant worker’s personal information twenty times, a female church
study group colleague’s personal information sixty-five times, another female church study group
colleague’s personal information forty-five times, as well as multiple other women from the church
study group’s personal information totaling over eighty times, to variously stalk and alarm the targeted
women); United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512 (2d Cir. 2015) (ruling on a police officer using
department database to investigate women he fantasized about cannibalizing); Van Buren v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 1648 (2021) (handling a police sergeant taking $5,000 cash to use a state database to
investigate whether woman was undercover officer).
114. As Ben Green and Salomé Viljoen explain, computer scientists should ask other questions
about the social impacts of their code, including:
Who are the relevant social actors? What are their interests and relative amounts of power?
Which people need to approve this algorithm? What are their goals? On whose use of the
algorithmic system does success depend? What are their interests and capabilities? How might
this algorithmic affect existing scientific, social, and political discourses or introduce new
discourses?
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intrusions by law enforcement. These inherent intrusions ensure the technology
can never be just.
II. WHAT COULD PREVENT FACE SURVEILLANCE?
The demographic and deployment biases of face recognition technology
are no secret. That is why legislators introduced the first piece of federal
legislation regulating face recognition in February 2020.115 The proposed law
acknowledged the technology’s demographic biases, stating that “[f]acial
recognition has a history of being inaccurate, particularly for women, young
people, African Americans, and other ethnic groups.”116 The proposed law also
recognized the technology’s deployment biases, stating that “[f]acial recognition
has been shown to disproportionately impact communities of color, activists,
immigrants, and other groups that are already unjustly targeted.”117 Given the
baked-in biases of face surveillance, the bill imposed a temporary moratorium
on its use by federal law enforcement.118 However, congressional representatives
failed to enact it as law. They likewise failed to pass bills introduced afterward,
though a new version remains before Congress.119
Absent enactment of a federal law, other attempts at face surveillance
accountability emerged. In response to the murder of George Floyd and calls
to defund the police, IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft announced corporate
moratoria pledging not to sell face recognition technology to law
enforcement.120 And across the country, states and cities enacted legislative face
recognition bans, moratoria, and regulations of their own.121 This part examines
both paths and unpacks why the prosecutorial, practical, and political shifts
necessary to realize them fall short as means of resisting face surveillance.
A.

Encouraging Corporate Moratoria

The summer of 2020 saw renewed protests calling to protect Black lives,
defund the police, and divest corporate development of surveillance tools for

Ben Green & Salomé Viljoen, Algorithmic Realism: Expanding the Boundaries of Algorithmic Thought, 2020
CONF. ON FAIRNESS ACCOUNTABILITY & TRANSPARENCY 19, 27 (proposing a new model of
“algorithmic realism” “to account for realities of social life and algorithmic impacts”).
115. Khari Johnson, U.S. Senators Propose Facial Recognition Moratorium for Federal Government,
VENTURE BEAT (Feb. 12, 2020, 3:24 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2020/02/12/u-s-senators-proposefacial-recognition-moratorium-for-federal-government/ [https://perma.cc/FV5M-J29L].
116. Ethical Use of Facial Recognition Act, S. 3284, 116th Cong. § 2(3) (2020).
117. Id. § 2(2).
118. See id. § 4.
119. See Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2020, S. 4084, 116th
Cong. (2020); Facial Recognition and Biometric Technology Moratorium Act of 2021, S. 2052, 117th
Cong. (2021).
120. See infra Section II.A.
121. See infra Section II.B.
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law enforcement.122 Within weeks of George Floyd’s murder, the biggest names
in commercial face recognition—IBM,123 Amazon,124 and Microsoft125—declared
they would not sell their face surveillance technology to law enforcement. For
all three, the announcement was unexpected, given the opportunities for profit
created by selling the technology to police.
After scraping a million photographs to fuel its own face recognition
algorithms,126 IBM was the first mover, sunsetting its general-purpose face
recognition technology entirely and proclaiming:
IBM firmly opposes and will not condone uses of any technology,
including facial recognition technology offered by other vendors, for
mass surveillance, racial profiling, violations of basic human rights and
freedoms . . . . [N]ow is the time to begin a national dialogue on whether
and how facial recognition technology should be employed by domestic
law enforcement agencies.127
In the only statement among IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon that does not
mention support for human rights, Amazon announced that it would be
“implementing a one-year moratorium on police use of Amazon’s facial
122. See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781
(2020) (arguing that a structural critique on policing requires an abolitionist perspective); Matthew
Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(arguing that criminal trial courts function as an unjust social institution and should be replaced with
other institutions that do not inherently legitimate police, rely on jails and prisons, or themselves
operate as tools of racial and economic oppression); Anthony O’Rourke, Rick Su & Guvora Binder,
Disbanding Police Agencies, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 1327 (2021) (assessing the disbanding of police forces
as a reform strategy from a democratic and institutionalist perspective).
123. See Arvind Krishna, IBM CEO’s Letter to Congress on Racial Justice Reform, IBM:
THINKPOLICY BLOG (June 8, 2020), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/facial-recognition-sunsetracial-justice-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/QG97-2D7C].
124. See Amazon Staff, We Are Implementing a One-Year Moratorium on Police Use of Rekognition,
AMAZON (June 10, 2020), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/policy-news-views/we-are-imple
menting-a-one-year-moratorium-on-police-use-of-rekognition [https://perma.cc/6S3A-4YCV].
125. See Jay Greene, Microsoft Won’t Sell Police Its Facial-Recognition Technology, Following Similar
Moves by Amazon and IBM, WASH. POST (June 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2020/06/11/microsoft-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/KV4T-TSFR (dark archive)].
Months earlier, Microsoft President Brad Smith said the company did not want a moratorium, claiming
that “the only way to continue developing [face recognition] actually is to have more people using it.”
Bill Radke & Alison Bruzek, Microsoft President Brad Smith on Consumer Privacy, NPR (Jan. 16, 2020,
2:23 PM), https://www.kuow.org/stories/microsoft-president-brad-smith-on-consumer-privacy [https
://perma.cc/XP9G-HGDA].
126. Ironically, IBM used the nonconsensually collected images for a dataset targeted to debiasing
face recognition algorithms. See John R. Smith, IBM Research Releases ‘Diversity in Faces’ Dataset To
Advance Study of Fairness in Facial Recognition Systems, IBM (Jan. 29, 2019), https://web.archive.org
/web/20190201133121/https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2019/01/diversity-in-faces/ [http://perma.
cc/8KB4-VSSD (staff-uploaded archive)].
127. Krishna, supra note 123. Perhaps the company learned its lesson from collaborating with Nazis
during World War II. See EDWIN BLACK, IBM AND THE HOLOCAUST 7–17 (2001). But see Vincent,
supra note 86 (developing an IBM tool to search surveillance footage by skin tone).
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recognition technology” in hopes that one year “might give Congress enough
time to implement appropriate rules.”128 Microsoft reiterated its decision not to
sell face recognition technology to law enforcement129 “until we have a national
law in place, grounded in human rights, that will govern this technology.”130
A trio of corporate moratoria is a triumph for researchers and advocates
who sounded the alarm about the dangers of supplying law enforcement with
face recognition technology. But that victory is compromised by loopholes.
Corporate moratoria are voluntary and, in some cases, temporary.131 There is no
means of public recourse if one of these companies decides that the just choice
fails to maximize shareholder value or advance leadership agendas.132 Nothing
in the moratoria prevents the selling of face recognition technology to entities
that collaborate with law enforcement.133 It is unclear from the moratoria
whether these companies are also refusing to work with government agencies
like ICE or the U.S. Department of Defense.134 But crucially, law enforcement
was never these companies’ biggest customer—and these companies were never
police departments’ biggest suppliers. IBM, Amazon, and Microsoft sell
consumer-facing products and have an interest in maintaining their public
reputations, a concern not shared by many other vendors in the space whose
customer base is law enforcement. DataWorks Plus, the company behind the
flawed face recognition algorithm that misidentified Williams, did not
announce a moratorium. Neither did many of the larger companies, like NEC,
nor the smaller, largely unknown companies—like LACRIS, Rank One,
Cognitec, and Ayonix Corporation—that supply law enforcement with face
recognition technology.135 When major corporations withdrew from the face
128. Amazon Staff, supra note 124.
129. However, the company contracted to sell other surveillance services to law enforcement. See
Michael Kwet, The Microsoft Police State: Surveillance, Facial Recognition, and the Azure Cloud,
INTERCEPT (July 14, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/07/14/microsoft-police-statemass-surveillance-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/Q7DT-KVCR].
130. Greene, supra note 125.
131. However, Amazon recently announced an extension of its initial moratorium—indefinitely.
Karen Weise, Amazon Indefinitely Extends a Moratorium on the Police Use of Its Facial Recognition Software,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/18/business/amazon-police-facial-recognition.html
[https://perma.cc/ATQ4-JCEJ (dark archive)] (Aug. 1, 2021).
132. Indeed, Amazon previously defeated shareholder efforts to prevent selling face recognition
technology to government customers. Zach Whittaker, Amazon Defeated Shareholder’s Vote on Facial
Recognition by a Wide Margin, TECHCRUNCH (May 28, 2019, 9:27 AM), https://techcrunch.com/
2019/05/28/amazon-facial-recognition-vote/ [https://perma.cc/E24W-VCFG].
133. Amazon expressly mentioned continuing to allow Thorn, which works closely with law
enforcement, to use Amazon Rekognition. See Amazon Staff, supra note 124.
134. Amazon previously pitched its Amazon Rekognition face recognition technology to ICE.
Russell Brandom, Amazon Pitched Its Facial Recognition System to ICE, VERGE (Oct. 23, 2018,
10:35 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/23/18013376/amazon-ice-facial-recognition-aws-rekog
nition [https://perma.cc/9E84-X8LU].
135. Council, supra note 7; Kevin Rector & Richard Winton, Despite Past Denials, LAPD Has Used
Facial Recognition Software 30,000 Times in the Last Decade, Records Show, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21,
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recognition supply chain, they left the least accountable companies in control
of developing face surveillance for law enforcement.
Corporate moratoria on face surveillance still bear a final flaw. Despite
acknowledging the harms of pervasive and persistent surveillance, none of these
companies committed to cease doing business with police departments. To the
contrary, the limited scope of these moratoria mean that IBM, Amazon, and
Microsoft can continue supplying other surveillance technologies, such as
predictive policing tools,136 smart doorbells,137 and cloud computing
capabilities138 to police departments across the country.139 As a practical matter,
these companies helped normalize face surveillance and continue working in
partnership with police departments—they cannot be trusted to dismantle a
system they helped develop.
B.

Enacting Local Legislative Oversight

World-renowned corporations are not the only ones creating face
surveillance technology—and relying on moratoria is not the only means of
recourse. Months after the revelation that Clearview AI amassed a database of
scraped photographs to fuel its face surveillance technology, the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) jumped into action, suing the company under an
increasingly invoked Illinois law called the Biometric Information Privacy Act
2020, 12:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-09-21/lapd-controversial-facial-re
cognition-software [https://perma.cc/PG5N-NEDQ (staff-uploaded, dark archive)]; see also Julia
Horowitz, Tech Companies Are Still Helping Police Scan Your Face, CNN BUS., https://www.cnn.
com/2020/07/03/tech/facial-recognition-police/index.html [https://perma.cc/S8DK-DTGF] (July 3,
2020, 8:36 AM).
136. IBM sold “near-instant intelligence” applications to police departments, which was not
discussed in the moratorium. Kate Kaye, IBM, Microsoft, and Amazon’s Face Recognition Bans Don’t Go
Far Enough, FAST CO. (June 13, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90516450/ibm-microsoft-andamazons-face-recognition-bans-dont-go-far-enough [https://perma.cc/4487-HLUD (staff-uploaded,
dark archive)].
137. Amazon continues selling Amazon Ring technology in cooperation with hundreds of police
forces. See Sidney Fussell, How Surveillance Has Always Reinforced Racism, WIRED (June 19, 2020, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-surveillance-reinforced-racism/ [https://perma.cc/JKZ6-9C
FX (dark archive)]; Drew Harwell, Doorbell-Camera Firm Ring Has Partnered with 400 Police Forces,
Extending Surveillance Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2019/08/28/doorbell-camera-firm-ring-has-partnered-with-police-forces-extending-surveil
lance-reach/ [https://perma.cc/E7XC-89XS (dark archive)]. Amazon Ring doorbells appropriate
technology developed by Black inventor Marie Van Brittan Brown, who patented the technology for
the first home security system. See Claudia Garcia-Rojas, The Surveillance of Blackness: From the TransAtlantic Slave Trade to Contemporary Surveillance Technologies, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 3, 2016), https://truth
out.org/articles/the-surveillance-of-blackness-from-the-slave-trade-to-the-police/ [https://perma.cc/T
8U4-74BJ].
138. See Kwet, supra note 129. Drones and robotic devices are also on the menu. Id.
139. This hypocrisy has not gone unnoticed by employees. See, e.g., Dave Gershgorn, 250 Microsoft
Employees Call on CEO To Cancel Police Contracts and Support Defunding Seattle PD, ONEZERO (June 9,
2020), https://onezero.medium.com/250-microsoft-employees-call-on-ceo-to-cancel-police-contractsand-support-defunding-seattle-pd-e89fa5d9e843 [https://perma.cc/AP2W-LVZV (dark archive)].
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(“BIPA”).140 BIPA makes it illegal for any private entity to “collect, capture,
purchase, receive through trade, or otherwise obtain a person’s . . . biometric
identifier or biometric information, unless it first” informs the subject and
“receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier or
biometric information.”141 As the ACLU alleged in its complaint, Clearview AI
did neither—the company failed to inform millions of people before scraping
their photographs, and it certainly did not receive written consent.142 The law
proved powerful in the past, forcing Facebook into a $650 million settlement
over its own flawed face recognition ambitions.143 Indeed, Woodrow Hartzog
suggests that BIPA is potentially the most important biometric privacy law in
the United States.144 But there is a significant problem with BIPA as a means
of tackling face surveillance: it only protects residents of Illinois.145

140. Complaint at 3, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. May 28,
2020).
141. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 2008 Ill. Laws 3693, 3695 (codified at 740 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 14/15(b)(3) (2022)). In 2008, the Illinois legislature enacted the law after Pay By Touch,
a biometrics company that provided retailers across Illinois with fingerprint scanners, filed for
bankruptcy and opened up the possibility that biometric information could be sold or shared through
bankruptcy proceedings. See Charles N. Insler, Understanding the Biometric Privacy Act Litigation
Explosion, 106 ILL. BAR J. 34, 35 (2018); see also 2008 Ill. Laws at 3693 (“The public welfare, security,
and safety will be served by regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention,
and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.”).
142. See Complaint, supra note 140, at 3. Ryan Mac, a journalist for Buzzfeed News, broke the
story on Twitter. See Ryan Mac (@RMac18), TWITTER (Feb. 13, 2020, 6:22 PM), https://twitter.com/
RMac18/status/1228097214578225153 [https://perma.cc/G5CX-HM6M]. Clearview AI faces at least
nine other lawsuits. See Adam Schwartz & Andrew Crocker, Clearview’s Faceprinting Is Not Sheltered
from Biometric Privacy Litigation by the First Amendment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/11/clearviews-faceprinting-not-sheltered-biometric-privacy-litig
ation-first-amendment [https://perma.cc/4CEZ-PBXB]. The company claims its business practices are
protected by the First Amendment. But see Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation as Amici Curiae
in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 6–7, ACLU v. Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 2020) (arguing that the First Amendment does not allow Clearview AI to
ignore BIPA and urging the court to apply intermediate scrutiny on any First Amendment issues).
143. Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement at 1–2, In re Facebook
Biometric Info. Priv. Litig., No. 15-cv-03747-JD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2020). The law has been invoked
against face recognition technology elsewhere. See, e.g., Rivera v. Google, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088,
1102 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (holding that Google violated BIPA for using photographs to create face scans);
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Ent. Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1204 (Ill. 2019) (holding that Six Flags violated
BIPA for using fingerprint scanners to obtain season passes).
144. See Woodrow Hartzog, BIPA: The Most Important Biometric Privacy Law in the US?, in
REGULATING BIOMETRICS: GLOBAL APPROACHES AND URGENT QUESTIONS 96, 96 (Amba Kak
ed., 2020), https://ainowinstitute.org/regulatingbiometrics.pdf [https://perma.cc/DRD4-HFT2].
145. See Dave Gershgorn, A Simple Way To Measure Whether Your Privacy Law Is Worth a
Damn, ONEZERO (Mar. 12, 2021), https://onezero.medium.com/a-simple-way-to-measure-whetheryour-privacy-law-is-worth-a-damn-2d591f0ac13 [https://perma.cc/7M7W-69C5 (staff-uploaded, dark
archive)].
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Illinois is not alone in its regulation of face recognition technology.146
Absent federal legislation, some states, like Oregon, New Hampshire, and
California, prohibit use of face recognition in body-worn cameras.147 Others,
like Washington and Massachusetts, regulate its use by law enforcement.148 New
York paused the use of face recognition technology in schools through recent
legislation.149 And in 2020, Vermont became the first state, now joined by
Maine and Virginia, to ban the use of face recognition technology by law
enforcement.150 In total, only ten states have taken action against face
surveillance.151 On the other hand, far more than ten cities have pursued
legislation, sometimes in direct response to police misuse.
Take San Francisco, for example. The city’s police department said that it
did not currently use face recognition but admitted to testing the technology on
mugshots from 2013 to 2017.152 To prevent the revival of those tests, the San
Francisco Board of Supervisors overwhelmingly voted to ban law enforcement
146. Texas and Washington also have biometric privacy laws, which are less litigated—unlike
Illinois’s BIPA, neither includes a private cause of action. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001 (Westlaw through the end of the 2021 Reg. and Called Sesss. of the 87th Leg.); see also
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020 (Westlaw with effective legislation through chapter 185 of the
2022 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.).
147. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.741 (Westlaw through Ch. 1 enacted in the 2022 Reg. Sess.
of the 81st Legis. Assemb.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.19 (Westlaw with urgency legislation through
Ch. 14. of 2022 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-D:2 (Westlaw through Ch. 29 of the 2022
Reg. Sess.); see also Fahmida Y. Rashid, Washington Is First State To Regulate Facial Recognition, DUO:
DECIPHER (Apr. 1, 2020), https://duo.com/decipher/washington-is-first-state-to-regulate-facialrecognition [https://perma.cc/SM7Z-EZ8C].
148. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.386.080 (Westlaw with effective legislation through Ch.
185 of the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, § 220 (Westlaw through
Ch. 41 of the 2022 2d Ann. Sess.); Kashmir Hill, How One State Managed To Actually Write Rules on
Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/27/technology/ Massachusettsfacial-recognition-rules.html [https://perma.cc/JH5A-SMPU (dark archive)] (Mar. 5, 2021)
[hereinafter Hill, How One State Managed].
149. Act of Dec. 22, 2020, 2020 N.Y. Laws 1142 (codified as amended at N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW
§ 106-b (2022)).
150. Act of Oct. 7, 2020, 2020 Vt. Acts & Resolves 951, 957 (codified as amended at VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 2369 note (2022)); Act of July 1, 2021, ch. 394, 2021 Me. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 6001 (2022)); Act of Apr. 7, 2021, ch. 537, 2021 Va. Adv. Legis.
Serv. (LexisNexis); see also ACLU of Vermont Statement on the Enactment of S. 124, the Nation’s Strongest
Statewide Ban on Law Enforcement Use of Facial Recognition Technology, ACLU VT. (Oct. 8, 2020,
2:15 PM), http://www.acluvt.org/en/news/aclu-vermont-statement-enactment-s124-nations-strongest
-statewide-ban-law-enforcement-use [https://perma.cc/7R8P-GY2M]; Igor Bonifacic, Maine Bans
Facial Recognition Technology from Schools and Most Police Work, YAHOO! FIN. (June 30, 2021), https://
finance.yahoo.com/news/maine-facial-recognition-law-19125274.html [http://perma.cc/5HP5-SB2B] .
151. Illinois, Oregon, New Hampshire, California, Washington, Massachusetts, New York,
Vermont, Maine, and Virginia. See supra text accompanying notes 146–50. As shown through this list,
not a single state in the Southwest has banned face surveillance. See supra text accompanying notes
146–50.
152. Gregory Barber, San Francisco Bans Agency Use of Facial-Recognition Tech, WIRED (May 14,
2019, 6:17 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/san-francisco-bans-use-facial-recognition-tech/ [http://
perma.cc/2PNP-HVM2 (dark archive)].
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and other agencies from using face recognition technology.153 The following
month, Somerville, Massachusetts, became the first East Coast city to ban
government use of face recognition technology.154 Kade Crockford, director of
the Technology for Liberty Project at the ACLU of Massachusetts, commented
that Somerville was “joining a nationwide movement to bring the technology
under democratic control.”155 In some ways, they are right: more than a dozen
cities enacted bans, moratoria, or regulations of face recognition technology in
the last several years.156 Many more have adopted community control over
police surveillance (“CCOPS”) regulations—which, in part, create oversight
mechanisms prior to law enforcement acquisition of invasive surveillance
technologies—that may have the effect of regulating face surveillance.157 But
these statutes do not always accomplish what the public expects.
Several cities’ statutory language suffers from the same shortcomings as
corporate moratoria: loopholes. Some laws—such as those in Pittsburgh,
Boston, Alameda, Madison, Northampton, and East Hampton—permit police
to continue relying on face recognition technology indirectly through state and
federal agencies, private companies, and even other police departments.158
Other laws do not preclude government agencies, such as airport and seaport
agents, from using face recognition technology.159 Law enforcement simply
flouts some laws. Despite explicit bans, the San Francisco Police Department
used a match from another government agency to investigate a gun-related

153. Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans Facial Recognition
Technology, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognitionban-san-francisco.html [https://perma.cc/32TQ-VVF6 (dark archive)].
154. Katie Lannan, Somerville Bans Government Use of Facial Recognition Tech, WBUR (June 28,
2019), https://www.wbur.org/bostonomix/2019/06/28/somerville-bans-government-use-of-facial-reco
gnition-tech [https://perma.cc/W3PY-KV3P].
155. Crockford is a lawyer for the ACLU of Massachusetts who advocated for city bans. Somerville
Becomes First East Coast City To Ban Government Use of Face Recognition Technology, ACLU (June 28,
2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/somerville-becomes-first-east-coast-city-ban-governmentuse-face-recognition [https://perma.cc/66L9-S6UM].
156. Those cities include Alameda, Baltimore, Berkeley, Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Jackson,
Madison, New York, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Northampton, Oakland, Pittsburgh, both Portlands
(Maine and Oregon), Seattle (via King County), and Springfield, with others being added regularly.
See Ban Facial Recognition: Interactive Map, FIGHT FOR FUTURE, https://www.banfacialrecog
nition.com/map/ [https://perma.cc/GQ6X-PQSF].
157. Community Control over Police Surveillance, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacytechnology/surveillance-technologies/community-control-over-police-surveillance [https://perma.cc/L
BY6-6TQ3].
158. Alfred Ng, Police Say They Can Use Facial Recognition Despite Bans, MARKUP (Jan. 28, 2021,
8:00 AM), https://themarkup.org/news/2021/01/28/police-say-they-can-use-facial-recognition-despite
-bans [https://perma.cc/Q4FY-J23Y].
159. See Barber, supra note 152.
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crime last year,160 and the Pittsburgh Police Department continued using
Clearview AI during Black Lives Matter protests.161
Further, stricter face recognition regulations remain unevenly distributed.
Most jurisdictions, including the entire Southwest region, have no laws
regulating the use of face surveillance technology by law enforcement. Detroit,
where law enforcement misidentified Williams and Oliver, responded to
pressure from activist Tawana Petty and other advocates by enacting guidelines
limiting police use of face recognition technology to investigate violent crimes
and home invasions.162 Despite the poor performance of Datawork Plus’s face
recognition technology, the city recently voted to extend its contract with the
company.163 Two cities, Miami and Washington, D.C., admitted to surveilling
Black Lives Matter protesters with face recognition technology, and neither city
responded by enacting laws governing the use of the technology.164 States and
cities must continue legislating the oversight of face surveillance, but relying on
localities leaves the technology to thrive where there is less political investment
in protecting people’s privacy—perhaps even where police desire less of it.
When we are all subject to face surveillance, we all need protection.

160. Megan Cassidy, Facial Recognition Tech Used To Build SFPD Gun Case, Despite Ban, S.F.
CHRON., https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Facial-recognition-tech-used-to-build-SFPDgun-15595796.php [https://perma.cc/AXR6-W9SU (dark archive)] (Sept. 24, 2020, 9:35 PM).
161. Juliette Rihl, Emails Show Pittsburgh Police Officers Accessed Clearview Facial Recognition After
BLM Protests, PUBLICSOURCE (May 20, 2021), https://www.publicsource.org/pittsburgh-police-facialrecognition-blm-protests-clearview/ [https://perma.cc/E9H9-MW56].
162. See DETROIT POLICE DEP’T, MANUAL DIRECTIVE 307.5 (Sept. 12, 2019), https://detroitmi.
gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/2019-09/Revised%20facial%20recognition%20directive%20transmit
ted%20to%20Board%209-12-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/2693-FXB4]; Thank You, Tawana!, DETROIT
CMTY. TECH. PROJECT, https://detroitcommunitytech.org/?q=content/thank-you-tawana [https://
perma.cc/SQY9-S7LG]. Williams and Oliver were wrongfully accused of larceny, which falls into
neither category. Hill, Wrongfully Accused, supra note 1 (discussing Williams’ charges); Anderson, supra
note 53 (discussing Oliver’s charges); see also Susan Crawford, Facial Recognition Laws Are (Literally)
All Over the Map, WIRED (Dec. 16, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/facial-recognitionlaws-are-literally-all-over-the-map/ [https://perma.cc/9YR4-DV5Y (dark archive)] (discussing limited
adoption of local laws prohibiting face recognition by law enforcement).
163. Miriam Marini, Detroit City Council Votes To Extend Facial Recognition Contract, Despite
Controversy, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Sept. 29, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.freep.com/story/news/
local/michigan/detroit/2020/09/29/facial-recognition-software-contract-extended/3578348001/ [https:
//perma.cc/Q3XW-K4W2 (dark archive)].
164. Tate Ryan-Mosley, Why 2020 Was a Pivotal, Contradictory Year for Facial Recognition, MIT
TECH. REV. (Dec. 29, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/12/29/1015563/why-2020-was
-a-pivotal-contradictory-year-for-facial-recognition/ [https://perma.cc/5W84-HA7N (dark archive)].
However, Washington, D.C., recently stopped using the face recognition technology under pressure
from advocates. Justin Jouvenal, Facial Recognition System Used To Identify Lafayette Square Protester To
Be Halted, WASH. POST (May 18, 2021, 4:28 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/publicsafety/facial-recognition-system-halted/2021/05/18/af2d19e2-b737-11eb-a6b1-81296da0339b_story.
html [https://perma.cc/CNF9-888K (dark archive)].
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III. INVOKING COPYRIGHT AND ENVISIONING AN (UN)FAIR USE ANALYSIS
Protection from face surveillance may come in an unusual form: copyright
law. Thanks to Oscar Wilde, copyright law protects photographs. In 1882, a
photographer named Napoleon Sarony created an image of the dapper author
leaning his head on his hand, apparently deep in thought.165 The Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Company began making and selling copied lithographs of the
photograph; Sarony sued. The Supreme Court found itself weighing whether
photographs were merely mechanical reproductions or works of authorship,
such as “writing, printing, engraving, etching, [etc.],” protected by copyright
law.166 The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that:
[Sarony] pos[ed] the said Oscar Wilde in front of the camera, selecting
and arranging the costume, draperies, and other various accessories in
said photograph, arranging the subject so as to present graceful outlines,
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and evoking the
desired expression, and from such disposition, arrangement, or
representation, made entirely by plaintiff, he produced the picture in
suit.167
In unanimously concurring with the lower court, the Supreme Court
determined that the photograph was “an original work of art” with an “author”
and of “a class of inventions for which the Constitution intended that Congress
should secure” copyright.168 One cannot own a copyright in one’s physical
features, such as a nose or mouth—the “facts” of one’s face—but copyright law
continues to protect rights in photographs that depict those physical features,
including the exclusive rights to create or reproduce copies of those photos.169
While facts are not protected by copyright, face surveillance generally
peddles protectable photographs.170 Different face surveillance companies take
different approaches to developing their datasets and algorithms. Some use
third-party datasets. Others use secretive, proprietary datasets of their own.

165. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54–55 (1884).
166. Id. at 58.
167. Id. at 60.
168. Id.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
170. Some scholars have speculated that Clearview AI only scraped “factual information” from
social media photographs, which would not be protectable by copyright law. See, e.g., Benjamin L.W.
Sobel, A New Common Law of Web Scraping, 25 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 147, 171–72 (2021); Feist
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S 340, 360 (1991) (holding that copyright law does not
protect facts). Derek Bambauer previously opined that providing copyright in face prints or facial
features, rather than photographs of faces, would be “stupid,” akin to “fixing alcoholism with heroin.”
Derek Bambauer, Copyright and Your Face, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 10, 2011), https://prawfsblawg.
blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/12/copyright-and-your-face.html [https://perma.cc/KC7S-2FYU]. As
discussed in Part III, however, at least some face surveillance companies copy and reproduce
photographs of faces, not merely factual information derived from those photographs.
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And still others rely on customers to upload photographs as matching datasets.171
But we do know how at least one company operates. And because we know the
most about it, it is used as an example through this part.
Clearview AI scraped photographs—including those used as profile
pictures—from sites like Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, Venmo, Twitter, and
many others, creating copies along the way.172 That is what journalist Thomas
Smith discovered when he requested his file from Clearview AI.173 He
submitted a candid photograph of himself making latkes.174 In return, Clearview
AI provided his “Face Search Results,” which reproduced nine other images
that the company identified as Smith.175 The face search results included an
“[i]mage [i]ndex” with links to the photographs’ source sites. Smith’s file reveals
that the company makes, stores, and reproduces copies of the photographs it
scrapes.176 Each copy is intrusive.177 Each copy is unauthorized. And each copy
is infringing.178 Which is why Tim Wu proclaimed that the company “should
be the target of a . . . copyright lawsuit.”179
171. It is likely that some of these companies would attempt to shield their datasets behind trade
secrecy in litigation.
172. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 8.
173. Thomas Smith, I Got My File from Clearview AI and It Freaked Me Out, ONEZERO (Mar. 24,
2020), https://onezero.medium.com/i-got-my-file-from-clearview-ai-and-it-freaked-me-out-33ca28b5
d6d4 [https://perma.cc/K3PT-3JRR (staff-uploaded, dark archive)] [hereinafter Smith, I Got My File].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. This is consistent with journalist Anna Merlan’s experience obtaining her own Clearview
AI file. Anna Merlan, Here’s the File Clearview AI Has Been Keeping on Me, and Probably on You Too,
VICE (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:17 PM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/5dmkyq/heres-the-file-clearview-aihas-been-keeping-on-me-and-probably-on-you-too [https://perma.cc/ZZ3J-7KU5]. DataWorks Plus
structures its search results similarly. Face Plus, DATAWORKS PLUS, https://www.dataworksplus.
com/faceplus.html [https://perma.cc/WZ4X-2QUD] (“If there is a possible match, you can choose to
view all linked images for a particular gallery image. This will display all linked images for that
individual that are currently in your agency’s database. This may provide you with images that are
easier to match against your probe image.”).
177. Just because a photograph is public does not mean its appropriation is not intrusive. See
generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (explaining
how disclosure of information in one context ought to conserve privacy from disclosure in other
contexts).
178. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (5) (reserving exclusive rights of reproduction and display to copyright
owners).
179. Tim Wu (@superwuster), TWITTER (Jan. 18, 2020, 7:26 AM), https://twitter.com/super
wuster/status/1218524978225741824?s=20 [https://perma.cc/ED8M-DERE (staff-uploaded archive)].
But see Tom Kulik, In Your Face: How Facial Recognition Databases See Copyright Law but Not Your Privacy,
ABOVE L. (Apr. 1, 2019, 5:17 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/legal-innovation-center/2019/04/01/inyour-face-how-facial-recognition-databases-see-copyright-law-but-not-your-privacy/rf1 [http://perma.
cc/SH7C-5JA7] (concluding that IBM’s scraping of Creative Commons-licensed images was likely fair
use); Jaren Butts, A “Face-Off” Between Copyrights and Human Rights in the Battle of Facial Recognition
Technology, WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. (Sept. 8, 2020), http://ipjournal.law.wfu.
edu/2020/09/a-face-off-between-copyrights-and-human-rights-in-the-battle-of-facial-recognition-tech
nology/ [https://perma.cc/6TDK-6MAH] (same).
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In the past, researchers and companies seemed sensitive to how copyright
law governs the photographs used to train face recognition algorithms. Raji and
Genevieve Fried documented how developers of early face recognition datasets
actually “pa[id] considerable attention to issues of copyright and the protection
of image ownership rights in distribution practices” and avoided legal issues by
creating photographs of subjects who consented to, and were occasionally
compensated for, participation.180 Facebook and other companies have used
their business models as a means to license selfies and other sources of training
data for proprietary AI systems.181 The Pilot Parliaments Benchmarks dataset
curated by Buolamwini and Gebru avoids copyright by using only public
domain images.182 And Microsoft and IBM scraped photographs from Flickr
designated with Creative Commons licenses183—to which Creative Commons
responded that “copyright is not a good tool to protect individual privacy, to
address research ethics in AI development, or to regulate the use of surveillance
tools employed online.”184 True enough. But even if copyright is not a good tool,
there are several reasons it may still be the one to get the job done for now.
One common defense of scraping does not shield against copyright
infringement: the First Amendment. In its motion to dismiss the ACLU’s
BIPA lawsuit, Clearview AI cited the Supreme Court’s observation that “[t]he
‘creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of
the First Amendment’” to support its claim that scraping photographs to fuel
face surveillance constitutes protected First Amendment speech.185 But as Julie
180. INIOLUWA DEBORAH RAJI & GENEVIEVE FRIED, ABOUT FACE: A SURVEY OF FACIAL
RECOGNITION EVALUATION 6 (2021), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.00813.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J6NGBSQ] (observing that scrupulous attention to copyright and consent faded with contemporary
scraped datasets).
181. Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 606–07 (describing AI’s “build-it model”).
182. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 19, at 79.
183. Madhumita Murgia, Microsoft Quietly Deletes Largest Public Face Recognition Data Set, FIN.
TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7d3e0d6a-87a0-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 [https://
perma.cc/ZZH2-GZBT (dark archive)] (describing Microsoft’s scraping of photographs from Flickr);
Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos Scraped Without Consent,
NBC NEWS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-littlesecret-millions-online-photos-scraped-n981921 [https://perma.cc/X4ZH-H57L] (Mar. 17, 2019, 11:25
AM) (describing IBM’s scraping of photographs from Flickr). This approach may have sidestepped
copyright issues, but it stumbled into ethical ones. To see whether your photographs are part of a
dataset, see Cade Metz & Kashmir Hill, Here’s a Way To Learn if Facial Recognition Systems Used
Your Photos, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/31/technology/facial-recognition-phototool.html [https://perma.cc/K5EE-7VFS (dark archive)] (Feb. 1, 2021) (describing Exposing.AI
investigation tool).
184. Ryan Merkley, Use and Fair Use: Statement on Shared Images in Facial Recognition AI, CREATIVE
COMMONS: BLOG (Mar. 13, 2019), https://creativecommons.org/2019/03/13/statement-on-sharedimages-in-facial-recognition-ai/ [https://perma.cc/84D9-2BKL].
185. Defendant’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss at 16, ACLU v.
Clearview AI, Inc., No. 2020-CH-04353 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 7, 2020) (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health
Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011)); see also Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Start-Up Mounts a First
Amendment Defense, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/11/technology/clearview-floyd-
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Cohen wryly notes, “to be a copyright lawyer is always in some sense to be a
First Amendment lawyer.”186 Copyright infringement is not protected by the
First Amendment—indeed, the Supreme Court sees no conflict between the
First Amendment and copyright law.187 The Court has specifically observed that
“copyright law contains built-in First Amendment accommodations” that
“strike[] a definitional balance between the First Amendment and copyright law
by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s
expression.”188
Not only do the First Amendment and copyright laws coexist, but
copyright can also serve as a significant deterrent to face surveillance. Copyright
law provides hefty statutory damages to the tune of $150,000 per instance of
willful infringement.189 Clearview AI alone sits on a system backed by copies of
billions of photographs, and that number likely grows each day.190 And unlike
many biometric and face surveillance statutes, copyright does not rely on action
by state attorneys general.191 As Woodrow Hartzog has concluded, “only private
causes of action seem capable of meaningfully deterring companies from
engaging in practices with biometrics based on business models that inevitably
lead to unacceptable abuses.”192 Copyright law happens to provide one.193
Despite the alarming biases discussed in Part I, some scholars remain
skeptical of using copyright to protect privacy.194 After all, the constitutional
abrams.html [https://perma.cc/KXJ8-5QS8 (dark archive)] (Mar. 18, 2021) [hereinafter Hill, Facial
Recognition Start-Up]. But see Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 2, ACLU, No. 2020-CH-04353 (amicus brief of First Amendment scholars). The
court recently found that “Clearview’s activities . . . are entitled to some First Amendment protection”
but found that intermediate scrutiny was satisfied. ACLU, No. 2020-CH-4353, at 9–10, https://www.
aclu.org/opinion-denying-clearview-ais-motion-dismiss [https://perma.cc/9BHB-R9DY].
186. Julie E. Cohen, Intellectual Privacy and Censorship of the Internet, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
693, 694 (1998).
187. Scholars are another story. See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright and the First Amendment:
Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 831, 914 (2010) (suggesting that
copyright law should bend to First Amendment speech).
188. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1985)). Eldred is a real bummer of a case for other reasons, such as
allowing the extension of copyright terms.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). These damages are limited to infringement that takes place after the
work is registered with the Copyright Office, however. Id. § 412.
190. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 8.
191. Michael A. Rivera, Face Off: An Examination of State Biometric Privacy Statutes & Data Harm
Remedies, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 571, 586 (2019).
192. Hartzog, supra note 144, at 96, 101.
193. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b).
194. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129 (1990)
(“The occasional attempt to read protection of privacy into the copyright is also mistaken.”); Rebecca
Tushnet, How Many Wrongs Make a Copyright?, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2346, 2348 (2014) (reviewing Derek
E. Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014), and rejecting the suggestion that copyright
should be used to protect the privacy of nonconsensual pornography victims); Fromer, supra note 24,
at 580 (referring to protection of privacy as an “ill-fitting motivation[]” for asserting copyright); M.
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purpose of copyright is to “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” not
to save society from invasive face surveillance.195 But the deep, damaging, and
damning biases embedded in face surveillance technology suggests that it does
not promote progress at all—and that copyright law is poised to prevent its
attack on privacy.
Other scholars concur.196 Shyamkrishna Balganesh has observed that
copyright is fully capable of not only addressing economic harms but also ones
that “emerge[] instead from the mere dissemination or use of the protected work
without the creator’s authorization, regardless of the objective utility or value
of such actions.”197 And copyright is no stranger to privacy. In 1890, Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis analogized privacy protection to copyright law in
their famed article, The Right to Privacy, by illustrating the ways in which

Margaret McKeown, Censorship in the Guise of Authorship: Harmonizing Copyright and the First
Amendment, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 8–9 (2016) (“[C]opyright is not the answer to your
privacy prayers.”); Edward Lee, Suspect Assertions of Copyright, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 379,
385 (2016) (“If a work has already been published with the author’s authorization, then the author has
effectively renounced her First Amendment right not to speak and whatever privacy interest in the
work copyright protects through the right of first publication is lost.”); Christopher Buccafusco &
David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2487–88
(2016) (outlining the adoption of an “incentive-relevant harm” standard, while acknowledging the
interpretative challenge for judges); Eric Goldman & Jessica Silbey, Copyright’s Memory Hole, 2019 BYU
L. REV. 929, 996 (“Despite the legitimate and sometimes profound harms experienced by some privacy
victims, copyright law should not be manipulated to fix privacy law’s problems.”); Sobel, supra note
170, at 170 (“Copyright is an economic right, not a privacy protection.”).
195. The idea that contemporary copyright remains beholden to the Progress Clause is unmoored
from reality. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (the Progress Clause); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537
U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding copyright term extension absent any supporting empirical evidence
justifying an extension).
196. Jon O. Newman, Copyright Law and the Protection of Privacy, 12 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
459, 463, 479 (1988) (“There is a strong indication in the early cases that while the right being
articulated was one of property, the interest being protected was one of privacy. . . . In shaping the
contours of copyright law, we should acknowledge the privacy interest not just for the great writers but
for each one of us.”); Bambauer, supra note 194, at 2058 (recommending amending copyright law to
grant subjects of nonconsensual pornography authorship rights); Amanda Levendowski, Using Copyright
To Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 422, 442–43 (2014) [hereinafter
Levendowski, Using Copyright To Combat Revenge Porn] (suggesting using the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act to remove nonconsensual pornography from the internet); Margaret Chon, Copyright’s
Other Functions, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 364, 366 (2016) (“Privacy and other functions of
copyright should not be categorically excluded as beyond the legitimate purview of copyright’s
concerns, and copyright will not be stretched beyond its breaking point by incorporating them.”);
Andrew Gilden, Sex, Death, and Intellectual Property, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 67, 68 (2018) (“IP is doing
work that it was not intended to do. And this is okay.”); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright,
73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37–59 (2020) (tracing the longstanding history of using copyright law to protect
privacy); Smith, Weaponizing Copyright, supra note 31, at 64 (“[T]here are strong arguments to allow
copyright to not only protect economic interests in copyrighted works, but also allow it to be
weaponized in limited circumstances to protect privacy.”).
197. Balganesh, supra note 196, at 7.
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copyright distinguished publicly permissible from disallowable disclosures.198
Nearly a century later, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “common-law
copyright was often enlisted in the service of personal privacy.”199 Today,
victims of nonconsensual pornography effectively use copyright law to remove
their images from the internet and seek remedies from infringers.200 As
Madhavi Sunder puts it, “the fact that intellectual property law might be
established for instrumental reasons does not mean that other purposes should
not be considered . . . .”201 So why has there not been an avalanche of copyright
infringement lawsuits against Clearview AI and companies like it? Fair use.
Beginning with fair use may feel like dropping into the middle of a
copyright infringement lawsuit—there are certainly other hurdles before a court
reaches fair use. A potential plaintiff, who may be the photographer rather than
the subject of the image (or in the case of selfies, both), must register their work
with the Copyright Office.202 That plaintiff, along with their attorneys, must
decide whether to proceed individually or as part of a class action.203 Even if
several plaintiffs proceed individually, their lawsuits may be consolidated and
transferred for coordinated pretrial proceedings through opaque multidistrict
litigation.204 If plaintiffs proceed through a class action, they must wait to see
whether their class is certified.205 But as the Supreme Court recently confirmed
in Google v. Oracle,206 fair use is a mixed question of fact and law that “primarily

198. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 199–205
(1890). Warren and Brandeis pointed to letters, contents of a diary, and a series of paintings or etchings
to illustrate how the flexible rules of copyright law might allow some uses (descriptions of the works)
while disallowing others (verbatim reproduction of them). Id. at 201.
199. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985).
200. Levendowski, Using Copyright To Combat Revenge Porn, supra note 196, at 442–45 (detailing
how to use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to remove nonconsensual pornography and
explaining that such infringement may be litigable with sizeable statutory damages); Online Removal
Guide, CYBER C.R. INITIATIVE, https://www.cybercivilrights.org/online-removal/ [https://perma.cc/
Y39E-LTCG] (explaining that victims of nonconsensual pornography may be able to rely on
copyright); Hauser, supra note 27 (describing copyright infringement judgment with sizable statutory
damages).
201. MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
GLOBAL JUSTICE 102 (2012).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 412; Fourth Est. Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881,
890 (2019) (“[I]t is the Register’s action that triggers a copyright owner’s entitlement to sue.”).
203. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (detailing class action procedures and requirements).
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact
are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.”). Proceedings may be transferred by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation or a party’s motion. Id. § 1407(c). For an illuminating discussion of how the
mechanics of multidistrict consolidation and class-action certification operate in information privacy
litigation, see Julie E. Cohen, Information Privacy Litigation as a Bellwether for Institutional Change, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 535, 567–70 (2017).
205. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
206. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
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involves legal work,” making it litigable at the motion-to-dismiss stage, which
may precede multidistrict consolidation or overlap with class certification.207
Addressing the question of fair use is crucial because making fair use of a
copyrighted work is “not an infringement of copyright”208—it is also a key
reason behind the Court’s finding that copyright law contains “built-in First
Amendment accommodations.”209 In 1841, a judicial decision about George
Washington’s correspondence gave us fair use.210 An author copied 353 pages of
an earlier book incorporating Washington’s letters, “private and official,” into
his own tome.211 Justice Story determined that copying the pages was an act of
“piracy” and announced a test for evaluating whether a copier’s use was fair by
“look[ing] to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and
value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the
sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”212
More than a century later, the Copyright Act of 1976 resulted in the codification
of fair use.213
Fair use calls on courts to assess four factors:
(1) The purpose and character of the use . . . ;
(2) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.214
As the Supreme Court recently observed in Google, “we have understood
the provision to set forth general principles, the application of which requires
judicial balancing, depending upon relevant circumstances, including
207. Id. at 1199–200. Timing for consolidation and certification are not statutorily defined. See
§ 1407(a) (“Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation authorized by
this section upon its determination that transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of
parties and witnesses and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions.”); FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the
court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”).
208. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
209. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)).
210. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
211. Id. at 345.
212. Id. at 348.
213. The Act was strongly influenced by Barbara Ringer. For more about the work and legacy of
Barbara Ringer, see Amanda Levendowski, The Lost and Found Legacy of Barbara Ringer, ATLANTIC
(July 11, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/the-lost-and-found-legacyof-a-copyright-hero/373948/ [https://perma.cc/82U6-YRGM (dark archive)] and Advancing Inclusion
in Copyright and Register Barbara Ringer’s Legacy, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF. (Nov. 19, 2020, 5:00 PM),
https://copyright.gov/events/barbara-ringer/ [https://perma.cc/2BRY-TG4F].
214. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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‘significant changes in technology.’”215 In that case, Oracle sued Google for
copying a portion of the Sun Java application programming interface (“API”),
which allows programmers to call up prewritten software that carries out
specific tasks.216 Google copied thirty-seven packages of Oracle’s declaring
code—copying that helped create the ubiquitous Android platform.217 In its first
decision to address fair use since 2 Live Crew was a chart-topper,218 the Court
applied the four fair use factors to determine whether Google’s use promoted
“creative ‘progress’ that is the basic constitutional objective of copyright itself,”
ultimately holding that Google’s copying was fair use.219
As I have written in previous work, ML will challenge and potentially
redefine fair use—many uses of copyrighted works to train AI systems, from
algorithms that recognize images of cats to those that autocomplete emails,
likely constitute fair use.220 However, the underlying rationales justifying fair
use in those instances may not hold in at least one sliver of the overall
ecosystem: using profile pictures for face surveillance.
Put another way, not all uses of copyrighted works as AI training data will
be fair use. This complexity is rooted in fair use’s flexibility. While fair use is
flexible, empirical and qualitative work by Pamela Samuelson,221 Matthew
Sag,222 and Barton Beebe223 demonstrates that fair use can also be surprisingly
predictable. This part uses Google v. Oracle, alongside other key fair use cases,
to assess each fair use factor as it applies to copying and reproducing profile
pictures. Section III.A begins by establishing that some face surveillance
companies copy photographs to fuel face surveillance algorithms for the same
purpose as users who choose the photos as profile pictures: particularized
identification. But even without a new purpose, such a use may still be
215. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1197 (2021) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)).
216. Id. at 1193.
217. Id. at 1191, 1193.
218. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (detailing the most recent
Supreme Court decision on fair use).
219. Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1203 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S
340, 349–50 (1991)).
220. Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 579; see also Lemley & Casey, supra note 26, at
745.
221. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009)
(giving a qualitative assessment of fair use cases that identifies “policy-relevant clusters” with predictive
power over fair use outcomes).
222. See generally Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) (giving an empirical
analysis of fair use cases that reveals the rationality and consistency of fair use outcomes).
223. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions Updated,
1978–2019, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1 (2020) [hereinafter Beebe, An Empirical Study Updated]
(providing an empirical review of fair use cases that identifies trends in fair use outcomes); see also
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
549 (2008) (reviewing an earlier set of opinions).
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somewhat transformative, favoring face surveillance companies. Sections III.B
and III.C then observe that the nature of the work is creative and that the use
features the photographs’ faces—the “heart” of profile pictures, creating
unfavorable outcomes for these companies under the middle two factors.
Finally, Section III.D explains how using these photographs harms the unique
licensing market for profile pictures, possibly foreclosing a favorable outcome
under the final factor. Face surveillance can never be just, and it likely cannot
be fair use either.
A.

Purpose, Transformation, and Character

The first fair use factor explores “the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes.”224 As the Supreme Court recently explained, courts
“consider[] whether the copier’s use ‘adds something new, with a further
purpose or different character, altering’ the copyrighted work ‘with new
expression, meaning[,] or message.’”225 As a shorthand for this inquiry, courts
ask whether the new work is “transformative.”226 A copier’s work is
transformative when it is “productive and . . . employ[s] the quoted matter in a
different manner or for a different purpose from the original. A quotation of
copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original is
unlikely to pass the test . . . .”227 Or as Justice Story framed it, “[t]he central
purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work merely
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation.”228
1. Purpose
Purpose is a straightforward factor when two works “at least at a high level
of generality, share the same overarching purpose.”229 This seems to be the case
with face surveillance. Social media users, journalists, and coders, among many
other web users, share photographs of their own faces to identify themselves
and match those photos to their offline identities. Empirical work by Scott
Counts and Kristin Stecher reveals that profile pictures are “particularly
224. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
225. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021) (quoting Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).
226. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Transformativeness is not necessary for a finding of fair use, but
empirically it makes a great deal of difference. See, e.g., Jiarui Liu, An Empirical Study of Transformative
Use in Copyright Law, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 163, 163 (2019) (finding that in dispositive decisions
upholding transformative use, ninety-four percent led to a fair-use finding).
227. Leval, supra note 194, at 1111.
228. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)
(No. 4901)).
229. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 11 F.4th 26, 40 (2d Cir. 2021),
amended, 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2021).
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important for conveying online identity.”230 The purpose of every social media
photograph may not overlap with face surveillance, but the purpose of profile
pictures and face surveillance is the same: particularized identification.231
Clearview AI, for example, characterizes the purpose of its face recognition
technology as “identification and matching of facial image data to stored facial
image and personal information data.”232 Social media users may be unlikely to
consider law enforcement when choosing photographs of their faces for profile
pictures, but the purpose remains that users are identifying themselves as
themselves to friends, followers, and even police who view their profiles.
But shared purpose is insufficient to subvert fair use. In Google, Google
copied portions of the Sun Java API “in part for the same reason that Sun
created those portions.”233 As the Court noted, limiting fair use to wholly
different purposes would “severely limit the scope of fair use.”234 Notably,
Clearview AI claims a different, transformative purpose, as discussed below.
2. Transformativeness
Even if Clearview AI and companies like it use profile pictures, even in
part, for the shared purpose of particularized identification, Google allows their
use if it is transformative.235 The company pitched itself as a “search engine . . .
providing for highly accurate facial recognition.”236 Its lawyer claims that the
service “operates in much the same way as Google’s search engine.”237 And it is
likely that other face surveillance companies believe the same. But search engine
and private subscription service cases complicate where face surveillance
companies fall on the spectrum of transformativeness.
In Kelly v. Arriba Soft,238 Leslie Kelly, a professional photographer, sued an
early search engine for “copying [his] images from other websites.”239 The
230. Scott Counts & Kristin Stecher, Self-Presentation of Personality During Online Profile Creation,
2009 PROC. THIRD ICWSM CONF. 191, 194.
231. NATHAN JURGENSON, THE SOCIAL PHOTO: ON PHOTOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL MEDIA 54
(2019) (“Anyone who has put together a profile page might recognize . . . the social photo may best
illustrate this kind of identity work. The self—that feeling that you are you and not someone else—is
a story you tell yourself to connect the person you once were to who you are now to who you will
become. Photography plays an integral role in linking the self over time.”).
232. U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 88779027 (filed Jan. 30, 2020).
233. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1203 (2021).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Principles, CLEARVIEW AI, https://www.clearview.ai/principles [https://perma.cc/GM3V-YJ
QA].
237. Ben Gilbert, Clearview AI Scraped Billions of Photos from Social Media To Build a Facial
Recognition App that Can ID Anyone—Here’s Everything You Need To Know About the Mysterious Company,
BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 6, 2020, 12:31 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-clearview-aicontroversial-facial-recognition-startup-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/3YCL-65UK].
238. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
239. Id. at 815.
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search engine proceeded to present Kelly’s photographs as low-resolution
thumbnails that “used in-line linking to display . . . a link to the original web
site.”240 The Ninth Circuit explained that a “search engine functions as a tool to
help index and improve access to images on the internet and their related web
sites.”241 In that sense, the thumbnails of Kelly’s images “do not supplant the
need for the originals. In addition, they benefit the public by enhancing
information-gathering techniques on the Internet.”242 Four years later, the
Ninth Circuit revisited the transformativeness of search engines in Perfect 10 v.
Amazon.243 Perfect 10 sold subscriptions to access photographs of nude
models.244 The company also targeted Google’s Image Search, which returned
thumbnail images of Perfect 10 photographs, sometimes from infringing
websites, along with “HTML instructions [that] also give the user’s browser the
address of the website publisher’s computer that stores the full-size version of
the thumbnail.”245 Judge Ikuta, writing for a unanimous panel, concluded that
images could serve “an entertainment, aesthetic, or information function, [but]
a search engine transforms the image into a pointer directing a user to a source
of information.”246 The district court had acknowledged the “truism that search
engines such as Google Image Search provide great value to the public.”247 Judge
Ikuta agreed, finding that “the significantly transformative nature of Google’s
search engine, particularly in light of its public benefit” weighed for a favorable
finding under the first factor.248
Both the Arriba Soft and Google search engines shared two key
characteristics: publicly transforming images into pointers to the original source
and serving a public benefit by organizing content for all internet users. As
Smith detailed in reporting on his own Clearview AI face search results, the
company includes links to the sources of each photograph at the bottom of the
results, but those pointers are only available to law enforcement subscribers.249
Directing users back to the source seems to be a necessary feature of search
engines but perhaps not enough to automatically qualify as one.
Unsuccessful “search engines” instead take the form of private
subscription services. In Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc.,250 a
subscription news monitoring service called Meltwater launched a business
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 816.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 820.
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1157.
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1166 (citing Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848–49 (C.D. Cal. 2006)).
Id.
Smith, I Got My File, supra note 173.
931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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model around “‘scrap[ing]’ an article from an online news source, index[ing] the
article, and deliver[ing] verbatim excerpts of the article to its customers in
response to search queries.”251 Like Clearview AI, the company called itself an
“Internet search engine,” arguing that it “provid[ed] limited amounts of
copyrighted material to its subscribers in response to their queries and thereby
pointing its subscribers to a source of information online.”252 To support its
claim, Meltwater noted that its digests generally included “a hyperlink to the
URL for the website from which the article was indexed.”253 However, writing
for the Southern District of New York, Judge Cote found that including links
does not automatically render a search engine’s use of copyrighted works
transformative: “Instead of driving subscribers to third-party websites,
Meltwater News acts as a substitute for news sites,” Judge Cote observed.254
The same may be true of Clearview AI and companies like it. But even if
Clearview AI funnels customers back to other websites, it remains unlikely that
the company fulfills that second search engine feature: serving a clear public
benefit.
Unlike public search engines like Arriba Soft and Google, services like
Clearview AI are pricey subscription services that are often available exclusively
to law enforcement. Indeed, Judge Cote distinguished Meltwater from a search
engine by noting that the company was “an expensive subscription service”
rather than “a publicly available tool to improve access to content across the
Internet.”255 Some may say that streamlining law enforcement investigations
serves one kind of public benefit, though the contention remains hotly
contested.256
Under its analysis of market effects in Google, the Supreme Court
questioned what might constitute a “public benefit.” The Court asked whether
“those benefits, for example, [are] related to copyright’s concern for creative
production of new expression?”257 Not surprisingly, the Court asked a version
251. Id. at 543. I previously worked on this matter as a summer associate at Davis Wright
Tremaine, which litigated this case on behalf of the Associated Press. All comment is based on public
information.
252. Id. at 550.
253. Id. at 545.
254. Id. at 554.
255. Id. at 553–54.
256. DJ Pangburn, San Diego’s Massive, 7-Year Experiment with Facial Recognition Technology Appears
To Be a Flop, FAST CO. (Jan. 9, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90440198/san-diegos-massive7-year-experiment-with-facial-recognition-technology-appears-to-be-a-flop [https://perma.cc/2EHUUHKW (dark archive)]; Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where
It Falls Short, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/facialrecognition-police.html [https://perma.cc/VZ34-CW7T (dark archive)]; Alfred Ng, Facial Recognition
in Schools: Even Supporters Say It Won’t Stop Shootings, CNET (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.cnet.com/
features/facial-recognition-in-schools-even-supporters-say-it-wont-stop-shootings/ [https://perma.cc/
T34S-M578].
257. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1206 (2021).
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of this question when assessing the first factor by querying whether copying
was consistent with “creative ‘progress.’”258 Here, as in Google, Clearview AI
“seeks to create new products.”259 From the company’s perspective, it
“expand[s] the use and usefulness” of profile pictures.260 Its “new product”
offers law enforcement a “highly creative and innovative tool” for
surveillance.261 However, creative progress is supposed to be linked with the
“basic constitutional objective of copyright itself,” leaving open an argument
that using profile pictures to fuel face surveillance fails to promote the
constitutional purpose of progress of science and useful arts.262
Thus, it remains far from clear whether face surveillance services provide
for the “public good.” While not a factor to be considered in and of itself,
whether a use serves the public good or benefit plays a role in courts’ analysis
of the first factor, including transformativeness. Face surveillance technology
has certainly been used to solve crimes.263 It has also been deployed to surveil
marginalized people and wrongfully imprison multiple people based on
demographic and deployment biases—and those are just the injustices that have
been made public.264 Creating massive searchable databases of millions of faces
collected without consent, maintained without regulation, and sold without
oversight to law enforcement strikes differently than presenting thumbnail
photos or snippets from books. Face surveillance is contentious and
controversial, certainly far from an unqualified public good.265
Setting aside whether face surveillance serves a public benefit or public
good, it cannot be argued that face surveillance companies provide a “publicly
available tool” in the manner of Arriba Soft and Google’s search engines.
Instead, face surveillance companies feel like an apt target of Judge Cote’s
conclusion that “using the mechanics of search engines to scrape material from
the Internet and provide it to consumers in response to their search requests
does not immunize a defendant from the standards of conduct imposed by law

258. Id. at 1203 (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S 340, 349–50 (1991)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
263. Law enforcement claims to have used Clearview AI, for example, to solve “shoplifting,
identity theft, credit card fraud, murder and child sexual exploitation cases.” Hill, The Secretive
Company, supra note 8. But at least one law enforcement agency, the NYPD, has countered that
Clearview AI’s marketing claims were inaccurate on at least one occasion. Tim Cushing, Facial
Recognition Company Clearview Lied About Its Crime-Solving Power in Pitches to Law Enforcement Agencies,
TECHDIRT (Jan. 29, 2020, 6:59 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200125/1846344379
8/facial-recognition-company-clearview-lied-about-crime-solving-power-pitches-to-law-enforcementagencies.shtml [https://perma.cc/QV5X-J96Y].
264. Hill, Wrongfully Accused, supra note 1.
265. See, e.g., supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.
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through the Copyright Act.”266 This may tilt against face surveillance companies
as they exist presently, but it perversely means that a company that makes its
tool available publicly—with all the use and abuse that entails—may be on more
solid ground.
Clearview AI also boasts about enabling “quicker identifications and
apprehensions.”267 Its argument tracks the Second Circuit observations in Fox
News v. TVEyes268 that “a secondary use may be a fair use if it utilizes technology
to achieve the transformative purpose of improving the efficiency of delivering
content without unreasonably encroaching on the commercial entitlements of
the rights holder.”269 In that case, a company called TVEyes copied “essentially
all television broadcasts as they happen, drawing from more than 1,400
channels, recording twenty-four hours a day, every day,” along with the
accompanying closed-captioning, and offered $500 monthly subscriptions to
clients.270 Judge Jacobs, writing for a unanimous panel, announced the court’s
conclusion that the service was
not justifiable as a fair use. As to the first factor, TVEyes’s Watch
function [wa]s at least somewhat transformative in that it render[ed]
convenient and efficient access to a subset of content; however, because
the function d[id] little if anything to change the content itself or the
purpose for which the content [wa]s used, its transformative character
[wa]s modest at best.271
Face surveillance companies arguably make even less transformative uses
than TVEyes, which “enable[d] nearly instant access to a subset of material . . .
that would otherwise be irretrievable, or else retrievable only through
prohibitively inconvenient or inefficient means.”272 While it is less convenient,
law enforcement regularly and successfully uses social media to aid
investigations without the help of face surveillance subscription services.
As Rachel Levinson-Waldman explains, “Perhaps the simplest way of
learning more about a target or group of individuals online is to follow them on
public social media platforms . . . . [This] easy availability of detailed
information about individuals’ activities has turned social media into a
wellspring of information for law enforcement.”273 And aside from face
266. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
267. Law Enforcement, CLEARVIEW AI, https://clearview.ai/law-enforcement [https://perma.cc/
C2BY-PGKY].
268. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 177 (2d Cir. 2018).
269. Id. I formerly worked at Kirkland & Ellis, which litigated this case on behalf of Fox News.
All comment is based on public information.
270. Id. at 175.
271. Id. at 180–81.
272. Id. at 177.
273. Levinson-Waldman notes that these efforts “inevitably put greater scrutiny on communities
of color,” not unlike face surveillance. Rachel Levinson-Waldman, Government Access to and
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recognition technology, the FBI and U.S. Capitol Police used photographs on
social media to identify, investigate, and charge suspects involved in the Capitol
Riot on January 6, 2021.274 ICE uses social media to identify, arrest, and deport
undocumented immigrants.275 Many other agencies rely on social media in their
investigations.276 Law enforcement has no problem using social media
photographs to identify targets—face surveillance companies merely make
accessing social media profile photos easier. The business model is nothing more
than “aggregated content already available to the individual user who was
willing to perform enough searches and cull enough results on the Internet.”277
Rather than providing a “database of otherwise unavailable content,” as TVEyes
did, Clearview AI and companies like it, “simply ‘crawl[]’ the Internet,
gathering extant content.”278 Judge Cote summed it up in Meltwater: “[U]se of
an algorithm to crawl over and scrape content from the Internet is surely not
enough to qualify as a search engine engaged in transformative work.”279
While being a private subscription service tends to weigh against
transformativeness, it is not dispositive. In A.V. ex rel Vanderhye v. iParadigms,
LLC,280 the company Turnitin developed plagiarism detection software that
used high school and college students’ copyrighted works as training data for
identifying lifted passages.281 There, the Fourth Circuit determined that the
software was “transformative,” despite being a subscription service to schools
Manipulation of Social Media: Legal and Policy Challenges, 61 HOW. L. REV. 523, 527 (2018); see also
Wayne A. Logan & Jake Linford, Contracting for Fourth Amendment Privacy Online, 104 MINN. L. REV.
101, 102–03 (2019).
274. Kevin Collier, Selfies, Social Media Posts Making It Easier To Track Down Capitol Riot
Suspects, NBCNEWS (Jan. 16, 2021, 6:34 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/selfiessocial-media-posts-making-it-easier-fbi-track-down-n1254522 [https://perma.cc/NM5D-YMSD]; Sara
Morrison, The Capitol Rioters Put Themselves All Over Social Media. Now They’re Getting Arrested,
VOX, https://www.vox.com/recode/22218963/capitol-photos-legal-charges-fbi-police-facebook-twitter
[https://perma.cc/VP7N-NUPC] (Jan. 19, 2021, 6:52 PM). Law enforcement also used face recognition
technology in investigating the January 6 insurrection. Drew Harwell, How America’s
Surveillance Networks Helped the FBI Catch the Capitol Mob, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2021, 9:00 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/02/capitol-siege-arrests-technology-fbi-privacy/
[https://perma.cc/5QC3-V2AT (dark archive)].
275. Max Rivlin-Nadler, How ICE Uses Social Media To Surveil and Arrest Immigrants, INTERCEPT
(Dec. 22, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/12/22/ice-social-media-surveillance/ [https://
perma.cc/7MLN-S6TJ].
276. See generally FAIZA PATEL, RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, SOPHIA DENUYL & RAYA
KOREH, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., SOCIAL MEDIA MONITORING: HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY USES DIGITAL DATA IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY (2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2019_DHS-SocialMediaMonitoring_
FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6Q6-TSGN] (detailing the Department of Homeland Security's
collection, use, and sharing of social media information).
277. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
278. Id.
279. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
280. 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
281. Id. at 634.
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and universities, “[because] iParadigms’ use of these works was completely
unrelated to expressive content and was instead aimed at detecting and
discouraging plagiarism.”282 Unlike Turnitin and many other applications of
ML,283 however, face surveillance is expressly related to the expressive content
of profile pictures: the images primarily communicate that the named user is
the person in the photograph.
3. Character
That leaves the character of the use. In the past, this would make for a
simple assessment: in 1985, the Supreme Court believed that “every commercial
use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation of the
monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright.”284 That view
has softened considerably. In Google, the Supreme Court clarified that
commercial use “is not dispositive of the first factor,” particularly if the use is
“inherently transformative.”285 Matthew Sag’s empirical work, however, reveals
that “[c]ommercial use by the defendant makes a finding of fair use less
likely.”286
Face surveillance companies’ uses are indisputably commercial. In 2020,
Clearview AI announced that it would end partnerships with private companies
and contract exclusively with “law enforcement or some other federal, state, or
local government department, office, or agency.”287 Despite losing the private
portion of its business, Clearview AI contracts with more than six hundred law
enforcement agencies, selling its services for tens of thousands of dollars—or
more.288 As recently as August 2020, ICE signed a contract for $224,000.289
Another case involving a searchable database of copyrighted works reveals
that commerciality may be especially likely to weigh against a copier where
there is no clear public benefit to the copying. In Authors Guild v. Google, Inc.,290
the Second Circuit examined whether the Google Books search engine, which
282. Id. at 640.
283. Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 590–91.
284. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). This was dicta,
but it nevertheless informed courts’ approaches to commerciality.
285. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021).
286. Sag, supra note 222, at 58.
287. Ryan Mac, Caroline Haskins & Logan McDonald, Clearview AI Has Promised To Cancel All
Relationships with Private Companies, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 7, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.buzzfeed
news.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-no-facial-recognition-private-companies [https://perma.cc/4Y
ME-CTDP].
288. Gilbert, supra note 237.
289. Lyons, supra note 103. Even the U.S. Post Office police use facial recognition technology.
Jana Winter, Facial Recognition, Fake Identities and Digital Surveillance Tools: Inside the Post Office’s Covert
Internet Operations Program, YAHOO! NEWS (May 18, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/facial-recognition
-fake-identities-and-digital-surveillance-tools-inside-the-post-offices-covert-internet-operations-progr
am-214234762.html [https://perma.cc/T2AC-3XDT].
290. 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
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provides short, searchable “snippet” views of scanned books to any internet user,
constituted fair use.291 Google, like face surveillance companies, “is a profitmotivated commercial corporation.”292 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge
Leval explained that “[m]embers of the public who access the Google Books
website can enter search words or terms of their own choice . . . . The search
engine also makes possible new forms of research, known as ‘text mining’ and
‘data mining.’”293 As with other transformative search engines, like Arriba Soft
and Google Images, Google Books not only provides a clear public benefit, but
it also does so publicly.294
In her qualitative analysis of fair use cases, Pamela Samuelson determined
that
copyright also promotes the public good when members of the public are
able to use copyrighted materials in a way that allows them to make a
range of reasonable uses that pose no meaningful likelihood of harm to
the markets for protected works, and when developers of new
technologies provide new opportunities for the public to make such
reasonable uses.295
Face surveillance does no such thing. The public cannot access face
surveillance databases or technologies, let alone do good with them. Researchers
cannot use face surveillance technology to audit whether companies’ algorithms
reflect or amplify demographic biases. Civil society cannot scrutinize whether
law enforcement customers deploy the technology without bias. Scholars cannot
examine whether there are more privacy-protective approaches to curating face
recognition databases. The limitations go on and on. Simply put, the public
cannot engage in any “new forms of research.”
When face surveillance services copy profile pictures and reproduce them
in response to face search matches, it imbues those scraped photographs with
no new expression, meaning or message. Those services share the same purpose
with web users who adopt photographs of their faces as profile pictures:
particularized identification. As Judge Cote concluded, commercial services
may “perform an important function for their clients, [but] the public interest
in the existence of such commercial enterprise does not outweigh the strong
public interest in the enforcement of copyright laws.”296 However, Google and
TVEyes suggest that face surveillance companies may nevertheless be somewhat
transformative. This factor tilts slightly in favor of face surveillance companies.
291. Id. at 207.
292. Id. at 217.
293. Id. at 208–09.
294. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1166 (9th Cir. 2007).
295. Samuelson, supra note 221, at 2617.
296. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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Creativity and Publication

The second fair use factor examines “the nature of the copyrighted
work.”297 Courts examine two features of a work when assessing its nature. First,
recognizing that “some works are closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to
establish when the former works are copied,”298 courts “consider whether the
protected writing is of the creative or instructive type that the copyright laws
value and seek to foster.”299 Creative works garner greater protection against
fair use than more factual ones.300 And second, courts consider whether the work
has been published, which provides greater latitude for fair use over
unpublished works.301 Until Google, the Supreme Court had little to say about
the second factor, dedicating between one sentence and several paragraphs to
its analysis in written opinions.302
Since Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,303 courts have recognized
that photographs are creative works protected by copyright law.304 The
protection of photographs is codified in the Copyright Act.305 In cases involving
copies of photographs, courts practically take for granted that photographs
qualify as creative. The Ninth Circuit observed in Arriba Soft, for example, that
Kelly’s photographs of the American West were “meant to be viewed by the
public for informative and aesthetic purposes [and] are creative in nature.”306
Revisiting the issue with nude photographs, the court determined that “our
decision in Kelly is directly on point. There we held that the photographer’s
images were ‘creative in nature.’”307
The calculus holds true in the Second Circuit as well. In Rogers v. Koons,308
the Second Circuit determined that Art Rogers’ photographic portraits of a
297. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
298. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
299. Leval, supra note 194, at 1117.
300. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237–38 (1990))
(contrasting fictional short story with factual works); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563–64 (1985) (contrasting soon-to-be-published memoir with published
speech); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455–56 n.40 (1984)
(contrasting motion pictures with news broadcasts); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 348–51 (1991) (contrasting creative works with bare factual compilations).
301. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
302. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449–50 (providing one sentence); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550–
55 (writing several paragraphs, but focusing on unpublished works); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586
(providing one paragraph); Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1201–02 (2021) (writing
several paragraphs).
303. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
304. Id. at 59–61 (finding copyright in photograph of Oscar Wilde).
305. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(5).
306. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
307. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
308. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
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couple holding puppies was “an original expression [that] has more in common
with fiction than with works based on facts,” concluding that the photograph
was “creative and imaginative.”309 Years later, in Cariou v. Prince,310 the court
reached the same conclusion about Patrick Cariou’s photographic portraits of
Rastafarians with a single sentence: “[T]here is no dispute that Cariou’s work
is creative.”311 Recently, the court reiterated that photographs are creative works
in Warhol v. Goldsmith,312 agreeing with the district court that Lindsey
Goldsmith’s photographic portrait of Prince is “creative.”313
Courts rarely provide lengthy analyses backing their conclusions that
photographs are creative, but photographs—particularly photographic
portraits—are consistently found to be so. On the other hand, profile pictures
may seem a far cry from a formal portrait of Oscar Wilde. However, as the
Supreme Court observed more than a century ago: “It would be a dangerous
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves the
final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations . . . . Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
their author spoke.”314 At the time, the Court was discussing painted
advertisements rather than profile pictures, but the idea of profile pictures is no
longer new—profile pictures are ubiquitous across social media, as well as
personal and professional websites. Photographic portraits adopted by website
users as profile pictures, including selfies, often involve specialized lighting,
camera positioning, and filtering—all creative qualities, and all weighing against
face surveillance companies.
In determining the nature of the work, courts also examine whether a work
has been published previously. Courts are more likely to find fair use if a work
has been published by the author. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he
author’s right to control the first public appearance of [their] undisseminated
expression will outweigh a claim of fair use.”315 Here, the photographs have
already “appeared on the [internet]” before they were used by face surveillance
companies.316 Even where photographs are published, however, courts find that
the second factor disfavors copiers’ uses when the work is creative.317 As a result,
309. Id. at 310.
310. 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
311. Id. at 709.
312. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 11 F.4th 26 (2d Cir. 2021).
313. See id. at 35–36.
314. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
315. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
316. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 820 (9th Cir. 2003).
317. See, e.g., Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (finding use of a creative, published work “weighs only slightly
in favor” of original photographer); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court “did not err” in finding that use of a creative, published work
“weighed only slightly in favor” of original publisher); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir.
1992) (finding use of a creative, published work “militates against a finding of fair use”); Cariou v.
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the nature of the works—published, creative photographs—weighs slightly
against face surveillance companies.
C.

Amount and Substantiality

The third factor considers “the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”318 In Google, the Supreme
Court reiterated that “even a small amount of copying may fall outside the scope
of fair use where the excerpt copied consists of the ‘heart’ of the original work’s
creative expression,” though that may shift where “the amount of copying [is]
tethered to a valid, and transformative, purpose.”319 Barton Beebe’s latest
empirical assessment of fair use cases revealed that the outcome under the third
factor “continues to correlate very strongly with the overall test outcome.”320
The face depicted in a social media profile picture identifies the user as
the user. It is the most important part of a profile picture. In Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,321 the Supreme Court was confronted with
the magazine equivalent of the profile picture. The Nation chose to excerpt key
portions of President Gerald Ford’s yet-unpublished memoir that reflected on
his decision to pardon President Richard Nixon.322 While the quotations were
“[i]n absolute terms . . . an insubstantial portion,” the Court emphasized that
the article was “structured around the quoted excerpts which serve as its
dramatic focal points.”323 The Court reiterated the force of Harper & Row in
Google.324 Specifically, the Court noted that
[i]f a defendant had copied one sentence in a novel, that copying may
well be insubstantial. But if that single sentence set forth one of the
world’s shortest short stories—“When he awoke, the dinosaur was still
there.”—the question looks much different, as the copied material
constitutes a small part of the novel but the entire short story.325
The heart of a profile picture is the user’s face, which identifies that individual.
That key portion of the work is copied for use as training data and reproduced

Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 710 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding use of a creative, published work “weighs against a
fair use determination”).
318. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
319. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1205 (2021) (first citing Harper & Row, 471
U.S. at 564–65; then citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994)).
320. Beebe, An Empirical Study Updated, supra note 223, at 31.
321. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 565–66.
324. See Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1205.
325. Id.

100 N.C. L. REV. 1015 (2022)

2022]

RESISTING FACE SURVEILLANCE

1063

in response to face match searches.326 Indeed, search results are literally
“structured around” photographs of faces comprising the results.327
Limited information is available about the internal mechanics of face
surveillance companies’ use of copyrighted works as training data. It is not clear
whether face surveillance companies copy entire profile pictures, excerpt users’
faces, or some combination of both.328 In any scenario, these companies
ultimately put the “face” in “face surveillance” and, in so doing, take the heart
of the work.
Making unauthorized copies of the “hearts” of profile pictures creates
other problems, but face surveillance companies could rely only on mugshots,
create their own original datasets, or combine both to avoid implicating
copyright law. But doing so may be legally unnecessary. The Supreme Court
explained that “[i]n principle, Google might have created its own, different
system of declaring code . . . [but] the declaring code was the key that it needed
to unlock the programmers’ creative energies. And it needed those energies to
create and improve its own innovative Android systems.”329 Like the declaring
code, existing profile pictures are the “key” to unlocking effective and efficient
face surveillance, and companies like Clearview AI need those “energies” to
create and improve their own face surveillance systems.
The sentiment underlying the Court’s analysis is not new. The Second
Circuit explained in Google Books that “complete unchanged copying has
repeatedly been found justified as fair use when the copying was reasonably
appropriate to achieve the copier’s transformative purpose and was done in such
a manner that it did not offer a competing substitute for the original.”330 But,
as discussed above, face surveillance companies have a weak “transformative
purpose” claim. A return to other public search engine and private subscription
services cases proves instructional. Those cases illustrate that copiers’ use of
works falls into three categories: (1) uses that take the entire work and display
versions of it publicly, like Arriba Soft and Google Images;331 (2) uses that take

326. See Smith, I Got My File, supra note 173.
327. See id.
328. It seems likely, however, that these companies are copying entire photographs at some stage
in their algorithmic development. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 627.
329. Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1205–06.
330. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015).
331. See Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It was necessary for Arriba
to copy the entire image to allow users to recognize the image and decide whether to pursue more
information about the image or the originating web site. If Arriba only copied part of the image, it
would be more difficult to identify it, thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine.”);
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because the same
analysis [as Arriba Soft] applies to Google’s use of Perfect 10’s image, the district court did not err in
finding that this factor favored neither party.”).
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the entire work and display parts of it publicly, like Google Books;332 (3) and
uses that take the entire work and display parts of it to paid subscribers, like
Meltwater, TVEyes, and iParadigms.333 The former two categories consistently
favor companies under this factor—but the third category does not.
In Meltwater, the Southern District of New York assessed that Meltwater
took
between 4.5% and 61% of the [Associated Press articles]. It automatically
took the lede from every AP story. As described by AP’s Standards
Editor, the lede is ‘meant to convey the heart of the story’ . . . . There is
no other single sentence from an AP story that is as consistently
important from article to article . . . .334
Similarly, there is no more important part of a profile picture than one’s face.
Companies such as Clearview AI take faces—the “ledes” of profile pictures—
from every profile picture. Notably, Judge Cote rejected Meltwater’s argument
that the “extent of its copying is justified because its purpose is to serve as a
search engine,” observing that the company “failed to show that it takes only
that amount of material from AP’s articles that is necessary for it to function as
a search engine.”335 Clearview AI makes no representations suggesting that it
takes just enough of profile pictures to support its purported purpose as a search
engine. Indeed, there is nothing preventing the company from alternately
structuring its face match results to show only confidence percentages and
referral links rather than reproducing faces from profile pictures.
The Second Circuit in TVEyes further distinguished the amount of
TVEyes’ use from that of transformative search engines. There, Judge Jacobs
explained that TVEyes’ service was “radically dissimilar to the service at issue
in Google Books,” which provides publicly only small snippets of text in
response to searches.336 Instead, TVEyes “redistributes Fox’s news
programming in ten-minute clips, which—given the brevity of the average news
segment on a particular topic—likely provide TVEyes’s users with all of the
Fox programming that they seek and the entirety of the message conveyed by
Fox to authorized viewers of the original.”337 Analyzing the third factor, Judge
Jacobs concluded that “TVEyes’s use of Fox’s content is therefore both
332. Compare Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 221–22 (“While Google makes an unauthorized digital
copy of the entire book, it does not reveal that digital copy to the public. The copy is made to enable
the search functions to reveal limited, important information about the books.”), with Authors Guild
v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 91, 99 (2d Cir. 2014) (characterizing a searchable digital library as not
being a search engine).
333. See Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 558 (S.D.N.Y.
2013); Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 3d 379, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
334. See Associated Press, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 558.
335. Id. at 559.
336. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 179 (2d Cir. 2018).
337. Id.
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‘extensive’ and inclusive of all that is ‘important’ from the copyrighted work.”338
Profile pictures are not as substantial as reproducing all programming by a
single provider, but users’ faces comprise the most important part of profile
pictures. By copying and displaying that portion of users’ photographs,
companies such as Clearview AI “likely provide” their law enforcement
subscribers with “all of the [faces] that they seek and the entirety of the
message” conveyed by social media users who selected the images, that message
being, “We are the people in these photographs.”339 Accordingly, this factor
weighs heavily against face surveillance companies.
D.

Market Harms

The fourth fair use factor analyzes “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.”340 In Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios,341 the Supreme Court noted that “[w]hat is necessary is a showing by a
preponderance of the evidence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm
exists. If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be
presumed.”342 Years later, the Supreme Court developed the phrase “market
harm” as a shorthand for the final fair use factor.343 In Acuff-Rose,344 the Court
stated that the factor
requires courts to consider not only the extent of the market harm caused
by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also ‘whether
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the
potential market’ for the original.345
The Court further advised that “[t]he market for potential derivative uses
includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or
license others to develop.”346 While the Supreme Court has walked back its
decades-old dictum stating that the fourth factor was “undoubtedly the single

338. Id.
339. Id.
340. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
341. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
342. Id. at 451 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has since moved away from the
presumption that commercial use causes harm.
343. See Dave Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 359,
365–66 (2014). Thanks to Dan Bateyko for this insight.
344. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
345. Id. at 590 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 13.05[A][4] (2022)).
346. Id. at 592.
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most important element of fair use,”347 Barton Beebe’s empirical work reveals
that the factor continues to dominate courts’ analyses.348
In Google, the Court expressed skepticism at claims that Oracle could have
competed in Google’s Android market.349 But the licensing market for profile
pictures is not so speculative; it is robust and well-established. Many web users
spend considerable energy curating their online presence, which includes
choosing photographs to operate as profile pictures on social media networks
and professional websites. Those pictures are particularly valuable to social
media networks, media outlets, and company websites.350 All five of the social
media companies that sent cease-and-desist letters to Clearview AI take
nonexclusive licenses in users’ copyrighted works, including profile pictures.351
Some companies, such as Facebook, even used their social network to acquire
licenses to users’ photographs to train their own face recognition algorithms.352
Despite the flaws of “terms of service” as readable contracts,353 users can
choose whether to license their profile pictures in exchange for access to friends’
347. Compare Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(describing how the “effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work . . . is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use”), with Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578
(“All [factors] are to be explored, and the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of
copyright.”).
348. Barton Beebe’s empirical work suggests that “factor four has remained the single dominant
factor in courts’ adjudication of the fair use defense.” Beebe, An Empirical Study Updated, supra note
223, at 4.
349. See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1217 (2021).
350. See, e.g., Edgar Gómez & Elisenda Ardévol, Playful Embodiment: Body and Identity Performance
on the Internet, 26 QUADERNS 41, 42 (2010) (discussing self-presentation on the internet as a form of
self-expression and opportunity to play with performance of one’s identity); Jiao Huant, Sameer Kumar
& Chuan Hu, A Literature Review of Online Identity Reconstruction, 12 FRONTIERS PSYCH., Aug. 2021,
at 1, 1 (reviewing scholarship centered on how online self-presentation, including profile pictures,
contribute to constructing identity).
351. See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms [https://perma.cc/
N9C4-S49J]; Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?template=terms [https://
perma.cc/CC4A-3X4S]; User Agreement, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/legal/user-agreement
[https://perma.cc/HS2T-NZWQ]; User Agreement, VENMO, https://venmo.com/legal/us-user-agree
ment/ [https://perma.cc/7DHH-UJL9]; Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/en/tos
[https://perma.cc/59PT-V4JG].
352. See, e.g., Yaniv Taigman, Ming Yang, Marc’Aurelio Ranzato & Lior Wolf, DeepFace: Closing
the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification, 2014 IEEE CONF. ON COMPUTER VISION &
PATTERN RECOGNITION 1, 5 (explaining that Facebook’s “DeepFace” AI achieved facial verification
accuracy of 97.35% identification by training on “a large collection of photos from Facebook”). In prior
works, I have referred to this approach as the “build-it” model for acquiring training data for AI
systems. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 606.
353. See Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the
Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services 2, 14, 16 (June 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757465 [https://
perma.cc/CBG4-XAFX] (including that in one study, seventy-four percent of participants skipped
reading a privacy policy with a “quick join” clickwrap and eighty-six percent of participants spent less
than a minute reading terms of service that researchers determined took more than fifteen minutes to
read).
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and followers’ (and even strangers’) status updates and selfies. Face surveillance
companies circumvent that market, making unauthorized decisions for other
networks’ users and offering nothing of value in return for their takings. Yet, at
the same time, these companies profit handsomely from selling such ill-gotten
photographs to private subscribers in law enforcement.354
Licensing markets play a decisive role in subscription service cases in ways
that pose problems for face surveillance companies. Concluding that the fourth
factor “weighs strongly against Meltwater,” the Southern District for New York
explained that the Associated Press put effort into developing an online
presence, including licensing its content to competitors of Meltwater.355 Judge
Cote proceeded to observe that Meltwater’s unlicensed use of Associated Press
stories “cheapen[ed] the value of AP’s work by competing with companies that
do” license AP content.356 She concluded that using the Associated Press’s
content without a license created an “unfair commercial advantage in the
marketplace and directly harmed the creator of expressive content protected by
the Copyright Act.”357 The Second Circuit in TVEyes similarly noted that “[t]he
success of the TVEyes business model demonstrates that deep-pocketed
consumers are willing to pay well for a service that allows them to search for
and view selected television clips, and that this market is worth millions of
dollars in the aggregate.”358 “[B]y selling access to Fox’s audiovisual content
without a license,” Judge Jacobs concluded, “TVEyes deprives Fox of revenues
to which Fox is entitled as the copyright holder.”359
But the Supreme Court in Google cautioned that “a potential loss of
revenue is not the whole story.”360 The Court acknowledged in Sony that
copyright law does not require a copyright owner to charge a fee for the
use of his works, and . . . the owner of a copyright may well have
economic or noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of

354. In the context of so-called “utility-expanding fair uses,” which likely encompass many other
applications of ML beyond face surveillance, scholars have called for variations on compulsory licenses
where licensing would be otherwise impracticable. See, e.g., Jacob Victor, Utility-Expanding Fair Use,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1887, 1921 (2021). Face surveillance, however, seems positioned to afford licenses:
Amid its legal troubles, Clearview AI has raised $30 million dollars at a $130 million valuation. Its
Israeli competitor, AnyVision, raised $235 million in a single month. Kashmir Hill, Clearview AI Raises
$30 Million from Investors Despite Legal Troubles, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/
21/technology/clearview-ai-valuation.html [https://perma.cc/PM4F-QHF8 (dark archive)] (Oct. 28,
2021).
355. Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 560–61 (S.D.N.Y.
2013).
356. Id. at 561 (emphasis in original).
357. Id.
358. Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2018).
359. Id.
360. Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1206 (2021).
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copying to occur without receiving direct compensation from the
copier.361
Jane Ginsburg, drawing from decisions of multiple courts, determined that
valuation under the fourth factor “need not be monetary.”362
The profile picture licensing market presents a conundrum. Licensing is
not, and should not be, necessary for every secondary use—particularly for
many uses by artists, libraries, reporters, and educators—yet it seems important
for uses in commercial face surveillance technology.363 Face surveillance engages
with the emerging market for an individual’s privacy, which people license away
for no fee. But face surveillance companies do deprive users of the right to
choose whether and to whom to license their works. There is a striking
similarity between the Second Circuit’s observation in TVEyes that “deeppocketed consumers are willing to pay well” for subscription services that serve
up unlicensed copies and the business model of face surveillance companies.364
A just exchange for use of the profile pictures for face surveillance hinges on
consent, not compensation. This is tricky to value under the final factor—or
within copyright at all.
As discussed under the first factor previously, the Court in Google stated
that, as part of the fourth factor, “we must take into account the public benefits
the copying will likely produce . . . . Are they comparatively important or
unimportant, when compared with dollar amounts likely lost . . . ?”365 It remains
361. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.28 (1984).
362. Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use Factor Four Revisited: Valuing the “Value of the Copyrighted Work,” 67
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 30 (2020) (citing Soc’y of Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v.
Gregory, 689 F.3d 29, 64 (1st Cir. 2012)); see also Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God,
Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Those rewards [from noncommercial copying] need not be
limited to monetary rewards; compensation may take a variety of forms.”); Chi. Sch. Reform Bd. of
Trs. v. Substance, Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 919, 933–34 (N.D. Ill. 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub
nom. Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 632 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Defendants’ publication
of the tests significantly decreased that value, and the court need not determine at this time the
monetary damage Defendants caused. The court finds no difference between a copyright holder losing
future profits because of a copyright infringement and the Board losing its future educational value of
its copyrighted work.”); Gregory, 689 F.3d at 64 (“[T]he fourth factor of the fair use inquiry cannot be
reduced to strictly monetary terms.”); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Ent., Inc., 342 F.3d
191, 202 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The statute directs us to consider ‘the effect of the use upon the . . . value of
the copyrighted work,’ not only the effect upon the ‘market,’ however narrowly that term is defined.
And the value ‘need not be limited to monetary rewards; compensation may take a variety of forms.’”
(emphasis in original) (first quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); then quoting Worldwide Church of God, 227
F.3d at 1119)), abrogated by TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 278 (3d Cir. 2019).
363. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other
means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”).
364. TVEyes, 883 F.3d at 180.
365. Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1206.
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unclear how a court would weigh the comparative importance of identifying
some alleged criminals against the fundamental destruction of privacy. To tilt
against face surveillance companies, a court would need to credit the idea that a
market is not exclusively measured by money—which is not impossible. But
that finding may be colored by how the court characterizes the benefits (and
harms) of face surveillance.
It is also worth noting that the approach currently taken by face
surveillance companies is quickly falling out of favor.366 Not only do many
companies acquire licenses to use profile pictures, but face recognition training
datasets reliant on scraped photographs are also being phased out in favor of
images obtained with consent. Multiple academic institutions, including
Stanford367 and the University of Washington,368 took hallmark public datasets,
all comprised of images used without consent, offline. Microsoft, formerly a
leader in face recognition before issuing its corporate moratoria,
decommissioned its popular MS Celeb dataset comprised of nearly 100,000
individuals featured in ten million scraped photographs.369 And the Conference
on Neural Information Processing Systems, a prestigious ML conference better
known as NeurIPS, recently proposed that its reviewers will account for
whether “people provide[d] their consent on the collection of such data” when
assessing submitted research.370
Licensing each work used as ML training data is often legally
unnecessary,371 but custom is changing for face recognition. This shift spells
further trouble for face recognition companies under the fourth factor. As
Jennifer Rothman observes, “courts often rely on custom as a proxy in making
other inquiries, such as determining the market effects of using another’s IP.”372
If this trend continues, a “plausibly exploitable market” may emerge for
licensing photographs to train face recognition algorithms, further disfavoring
face surveillance companies.373
366. RAJI & FRIED, supra note 180, at 8.
367. See Russell Stewart, Brainwash Dataset, STAN. DIGIT. REPOSITORY (2015), https://purl.stan
ford.edu/sx925dc9385 [https://perma.cc/MDG5-8G5S].
368. MegaFace and MF2: Million Scale Face Recognition, UNIV. WASH., http://megaface.cs.washing
ton.edu/ [https://perma.cc/DUS2-7DEN].
369. Madhumita Murgia, Microsoft Quietly Deletes Largest Public Face Recognition Data Set, FIN.
TIMES (June 6, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/7d3e0d6a-87a0-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2 [https://
perma.cc/7J8Q-JLKD (dark archive)]. The images were shared under Creative Commons licenses. Id.
370. Ethics Guidelines, NEURIPS 2021 (2022), https://neurips.cc/public/EthicsGuidelines [https://
perma.cc/LHW6-SXRC]. I consulted on the development of the Ethics Guidelines as an advisor to
the Research Ethics Committee.
371. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 629; Lemley & Casey, supra note 26, at 759.
372. Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV.
1899, 1906 (2007).
373. See Fox News Network, LLC v. TVEyes, Inc., 883 F.3d 169, 180 (2d Cir. 2018). A plausibility
framing is both novel and singular among fair use analyses, but subsequent Second Circuit cases have
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CONCLUSION
In Acuff-Rose, the Supreme Court explained that “the four statutory factors
[cannot] be treated in isolation, one from another. All are to be explored, and
the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”374
Promoting public access to knowledge remains a principal purpose of copyright
law.375 But face surveillance companies’ secretive sales of subscription services
to law enforcement do not promote public access to knowledge—quite the
contrary. Taken together, the fair use factors could weigh against companies’
copying and reproduction of web users’ copyrightable profile pictures for face
surveillance.
Even so, copyright law remains no one’s first choice for resisting face
surveillance. Copyright can permit, and even perpetuate, biases that animate
invasive face recognition.376 It protects against profile pictures being copied by
face surveillance companies, but not against wedding pictures and vacation
photos being used to fuel face surveillance. It also requires some knowledge of
face surveillance datasets to effectively litigate.377 But the alternatives, barring
a ban, are no less limiting. Jeanne Fromer has asked whether we should care
about the reasons why copyright is being invoked.378 We should care deeply
when copyright is weaponized for censorship or harassment.379 But face
surveillance is actively harming marginalized communities, and the remaining
public is unlikely to fare much better. Perhaps the more urgent question is
whether the assertion of copyright can effectively do good. Here, the answer is
yes.
The Venn diagram of modern technological copyright challenges and
privacy puzzles continues to more closely resemble a circle, at the center of
which sit three fundamental questions: who must give consent, to whom, and
for what purposes. We must also grapple with the reality that decades of
lobbying created an environment in which existing copyright law does a better
not walked it back. See, e.g., Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 11 F.4th 26,
49 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing TVEyes without rejecting its plausibility framing).
374. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994).
375. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
376. See Levendowski, Copyright Law, supra note 19, at 630.
377. This information is not impossible to uncover. Clearview AI offers a portal for Californians
to request their photographs, which is how journalists Thomas Smith and Anna Merlan acquired their
face search results. See CCPA Data Access Form, CLEARVIEW.AI, https://clearviewai.typeform.com/to/
wDa2sO [https://perma.cc/N4NA-6ZWW (staff-uploaded archive)].
378. Fromer, supra note 24, at 549.
379. See, e.g., Smith, Weaponizing Copyright, supra note 31, at 68 (“Advocating for copyright to be
weaponized to protect privacy interests might serve victims of nonconsensual pornography and victims
of other forms of forced disclosure of private information, and allow them to control the removal or
dissemination of their personal content or images. However, it could also open the door for copyright
owners to claim protection of privacy interests when their ultimate goal is to suppress unwelcome
speech and silence and erase basic information and facts.”).
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job of protecting the public against privacy harms than many alternatives.380 As
it stands, copyright remains a powerful means of preventing invasive face
surveillance technology from dismantling privacy.
Make no mistake, the use of face recognition technology by law
enforcement should be banned. In the meantime, researchers must continue
interrogating which uses of face recognition technology recalibrate power and
promote justice rather than settling for ones that are legally defensible. Lawyers
must continue thinking creatively about holding face surveillance companies
legally accountable.381 And activists must continue pressing politicians to pass
local oversight regulations. David Scalzo, one of Clearview AI’s early investors,
speculated that “[l]aws have to determine what’s legal, but you can’t ban
technology. Sure, that might lead to a dystopian future or something, but you
can’t ban it.”382 So far, he has been largely correct. But if we invoke existing
copyright law to protect the public from face surveillance, we may buy ourselves
enough time to wait for the federal ban we need.

380. See, e.g., Hauser, supra note 27 (awarding $450,000 for copyright infringement).
381. See, e.g., Vermont Clearview AI Complaint, supra note 25, at 1 (alleging violation of UDAP
law); Renderos Complaint, supra note 25, at 1 (alleging violation of invasion of likeness law).
382. Hill, The Secretive Company, supra note 8.
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